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Purpose – This dissertation investigated the degree to which the City of Cape Town understands 
a ‘notional’ Cape Town property developer within the Transit-Orientated Development (“TOD”) 
context. This dissertation is not meant to draw a distinction between a right or wrong model of a 
local property developer, but to investigate what a richer model would look like using alternative 
economic perspectives that capture the multiplicity of reality and possible TOD policy 
implications. 
Design – A literature review was undertaken to understand institutional and behavioural 
economic frameworks, how each framework relates to the property market, and how to use the 
frameworks to assist in defining a developer. Further research was conducted to consider the 
property development process from the perspective of the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
framework. The property developer as an actor within the property market was then 
deconstructed. Alternative approaches to local government involvement in the development 
industry and the developer’s perspective on TOD was also explored. A qualitative, semi-structured 
localist interview was conducted with nine major developers operating in Cape Town. They were 
selected because they are likely to participate in catalytic TOD-type projects. The interview aimed 
to understand their world view and how their lived experience relates to the City of Cape Town 
municipality. 
Findings – There is a ‘definition gap’ between how the City of Cape Town has defined a developer 
and the findings of this dissertation. Policy implies a developer has perfect decision-making 
qualities pursuing maximum profits, whereas this dissertation found that developers tend to be 
focussed on risk reduction and exhibit satisficing and loss-averse behaviour. There are also those 
who prefer to build and hold a portfolio of rental properties which are not defined in policy. This 
type of developer possesses a different outlook and investment behaviour than the one defined 
in the TOD Strategic Framework. The City of Cape Town does not appreciate its positioning within 
and its influence on local property market dynamics, as it relates to the ‘rules of the game’.  
Practical Implications – Without understanding these distinctions, developers may not 
necessarily, predictably and readily respond to any TOD incentives and levers as set out in the 
Framework, resulting in policy perpetuating the very spatial inequalities and status quo the City 
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“You see, very few things in life are black and white—there are layers, nuances, hidden 
patterns to most things you will encounter in life. It’s true that Christopher Columbus was 
one of the great explorers of history who single-handedly changed the course of the world, 
but it’s also true that he was an enabler of slavery; by most metrics Bill Clinton was a 
successful president, but he was also a sexual predator—both realities co-exist, in both 
cases.”  















CHAPTER 1: PROPOSAL 
1.1  Introduction 
There have been many global studies examining the effects of transit investments on private 
property prices. In particular, and most often, how an increase in private property prices can 
justify ‘capturing’ a portion of the value increment, in what is known as, ‘Land Value Capture’ or 
“LVC”. 
 
LVC is an approach in terms of which a public authority can ‘capture’ private land value increases, 
arising from public or government investments. This captured value can be used to offset the 
costs of the government investment or be used to fund the general fiscus. 
 
This dissertation does not conduct a deep analysis of the concept of LVC in South Africa, in terms 
of which plenty of research has already been conducted, which examines various of the main 
components of LVC. That said, one key aspect of LVC has yet to be thoroughly interrogated. That 
is, what is required, in the first instance, before the private market can react to a public 
investment, and what local government can do to ensure that certain prerequisites are achieved 
for property value increments to be maximised and properly reinvested. It is posited that only 
once such prerequisites are understood, facilitated, and secured, can the LVC tool be effectively 
utilised.    
 
This dissertation therefore focuses on this component of LVC, and sets out to define these 
prerequisites; particularly, those prerequisites required for private property developers in a 
Transit-Orientated Development (TOD) context to be incentivised to participate in, or to 
implement developments and reinvestments from within this context. 
 
In doing so, this dissertation relies on the City of Cape Town (“CCT”) as a local government case 
example, and seeks to define the specific prerequisites required in order for developers in Cape 
Town to be incentivised to carry out developments, operating within the perceived policy 
confines of the CCT’s recently adopted Transit Orientated Development (“TOD”) Strategic 





and to ‘construct’ a notional Cape Town property developer (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012) 
in a TOD context. 
1.2 Understanding the TOD Strategic Framework 
The Framework is primarily a policy mechanism to implement TOD in Cape Town. It is also an 
exploration of possible tools and mechanisms to be used by relevant stakeholders who have a 
collective impact on the urban form so that the CCT’s built environment becomes more 
sustainable, compact and equitable. 
 
The concept of TOD 
The concept of TOD originated in North America during the 1980s as a form of ‘New Urbanism’, 
New Urbanism is a response to the growing negative effects, including the “proliferation of 
sprawling, mono-functional spatial patterns” (Bickford, 2016: 13), of placing the private car at 
the centre of city development, while ignoring the end-user (Carlton, 2007). New Urbanism is a 
planning and development approach based on the principles of how cities and towns had been 
built for the last several centuries. That is, with walkable blocks and streets, housing and 
shopping in close proximity, and accessible public spaces. In other words, New Urbanism focuses 
on human-scaled urban design (Wilkinson, 2006 and Carlton, 2007). To ensure that this form of 
urban growth is sustainable, there must be less reliance on access to private automobiles, and 
more support for and dependence on public infrastructure and non-motorised transport options. 
Consequently, to support and drive dependence on public transport infrastructure and human-
scaled mobility, development (SAPOA, 2016)) must be synchronised with and complement public 
transit infrastructure such that commuters’ lifestyle choices are positively affected.  
 
Bickford & Behrens (2015) observe that car dependency is increasing in South African cities and 
that apartheid spatial planning persists, thus contributing towards inequality. African and 
Coloured townships are reliant on walking or public transport for carrying out daily activities and 
inhabitants cannot afford a private car. This “‘captive’ transport user” (Wilkinson, 2006: 228) is 
usually found at the sprawling fringes of the city, forced to endure long journey times and a 






If the genesis of TOD lies in creating human-scaled and human-centric development with less 
reliance on the private car, then TOD offers a “potentially useful concept to drive the 
restructuring of South African socio-spatial patterns.” (Bickford & Behrens, 2015: 375). 
 
The Framework defines TOD for Cape Town based on principles and not discrete pre-requisites. 
The core TOD principles for Cape Town are defined below: 
1. Affordability – reduce the cost of public transport to commuters and the cost of providing 
public transport to the city. 
2. Accessibility – facilitate equal access to social and economic activity through strategic 
urban development and the provision of safe public transport. 
3. Efficiency – provide an environment and level of service that reduces trip lengths and 
dependence on private vehicles. 
4. Intensification and densification – manage the desired form, composition and location of 
urban development conducive to affordable, accessible and efficient public transport. 
It is interesting to note that the principle of affordability only applies to public transport and not 
to housing.  
 
The Framework is placed at the centre of the CCT’s future spatial urban growth planning and 
recognises the interplay between transit and urban development, its effect on the urban form, 
and how these two levers can be used to create optimised movement patterns that influence 
the urban landscape efficiently and sustainably to reduce social and economic inequalities (City 
of Cape Town b, 2016; City of Cape Town c, 2017). The Framework also recognises that in order 
to improve efficiency and sustainability and to reduce inequality through transit and urban 
development, property development must be compact, walkable, and transit supportive 
(Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo, 2016) and must be able to support the costs of 
implementing TOD and to fund transit operations.  
 
South African cities face considerable hurdles in achieving this type of property development. 
Such hurdles include a considerably overburdened national fiscus, historic inefficient land-use 
patterns, inefficient transport behaviour (Scorcia & Munoz-Raskin, 2017) and ailing rail 
infrastructure (Bosch, 2018). Cape Town is no exception, with all these factors conspiring against 





The graphs below depict population densities of emerging-economy cities in South America 
against those cities’ Bus Rapid Transport revenue’s proportional fare coverage of operating costs. 
The City of Johannesburg is included as a proxy of South African metropolitan cities and clearly 
indicates that the sustainability of TOD (of which BRT is an important transport mode) transport 
is highly dependent on population density, particularly around transit nodes.  
 
Figure 1: land-use patterns of SA metropolitan cities conspire against the mass public transit systems to sustain itself (Cartwright, 
2018) 
 
In order to achieve this required level and quality of dense and intense property development; 
that is, property development which is capable of supporting and sustaining TOD 
implementation costs, funding transit operations, and in so doing, maximising return on public 
investment (Beukes, 2016), the CCT will not only have to undertake a considerable infrastructure 
spend but will have to properly understand the motives and behaviours of property developers 
operating in Cape Town. In effect, the CCT must invert the old order of spatial and transit 
planning in which “the transportation system [was] subservient to and conditioned by the 
existing spatial structure.”(Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo, 2016: 2). 
 
The study conducted by Beukes(2016) demonstrates the negative fiscal impacts of a costly 
rollout-out of transit-adjacent systems. Beukes (2016) examines the rollout of the MyCiti BRT 
(“MyCiti”) in Cape Town and identifies it as an example of where a lack of understanding of local 
property market dynamics in fact has the effect of undermining any planning assumptions that 
triggered the implementation of the MyCiti in the first place (Scorcia & Munoz-Raskin, 2017).  
 
Beukes (2016) states further that as the rollout of the BRT infrastructure continues, the CCT will 





impetus on ensuring that TOD projects (which require massive capital expenditure) are 
financially sustainable and that they generate critical passenger mass in order to sustain 
operational costs without undermining the financial stability of the CCT. To reach the critical 
passenger mass threshold, it is important for TOD projects to leverage the untapped real estate 
demand in and around designated TOD areas.  
 
Currently, the City’s sprawling urban growth and relatively low densities of suburban 
communities entrench the dependence on the use of private automobiles (Bosch, 2018) and 
therefore challenge the sustainability of the MyCiti, and by implication TOD rollout and 
operations (Scorcia & Munoz-Raskin, 2017). For the 2016/2017 financial year, the MyCiti service 
ran at a weekly loss of R1m. This deficit reflects the travel behaviour of citizens and the inefficient 
spatial and land-use dilemma (Beukes, 2016).  
 
The Framework acknowledges that to overcome the operating cost hurdles associated with TOD 
projects, the CCT must seek alternative sources of funding and partnerships (CCT A, 2016) to fund 
the TOD rollout and BRT operations, in order to rely less on the national fiscus.  
 
Along with the various mechanism or tools that CCT may potentially employ as part of its strategy 
in the rollout of TOD, the Framework, in its ‘Financing Toolkit’, recognises LVC as such an 
alternative financing tool capable of accommodating these scenarios and overcoming TOD 
operating costs hurdles. 
 
1.3 Real estate market requirements for LVC in the TOD context  
If used optimally, the Framework also envisages that LVC could potentially do much more than 
simply be an alternative source of financing, but that it could also enable the CCT, in collaboration 
with the private sector, to: 
i. be proactive and responsive towards infrastructure projects, as opposed to being 
subjected to onerous national and local government capital projects financing 
procedures, particularly, where direct transfers from National Treasury are required; 
ii. support infrastructure projects that directly influence and aim to redress economic, social 





iii. leverage funds without negatively affecting the debt ratios, and ultimately, the balance 
sheet of the CCT (McGaffin et al., 2016) 
 
Before these benefits can be realised however, the CCT must pause to consider the pre-requisites 
which must be in place in the property market before LVC can be optimally engaged. Beukes 
(2016) highlights the marginally negative effects the MyCiti infrastructure has had, and 
continues, to have on property values. As already discussed above, these negative effects suggest 
that transport infrastructure on its own won't automatically deliver incremental increases in 
property values.  
 
A closer reading of Beukes' (2016) work reveals that a nuanced approached is required when 
trying to understand what effects transport infrastructure, and by extension, the TOD rollout, 
will have on local property markets. Beukes (2016) finds that no conclusive variables, including 
BRT, were found to have any material impact on house prices. He observes that in respect of a 
suburb with high income single residential use dominated by private cars, BRT has in fact had a 
marginally negative impact on house prices within a 500m radius of a stop.  
 
Santos, Alorro & Goliath (2016) presented a layered research on nine popular and possible LVC 
tools which the CCT could potentially use to fund its TOD infrastructure and its operational 
expenses. The research was based on global case studies, each with its own unique ecosystem. 
However, it should be noted that these case studies were limited in scope, focusing only on “best 
practices" (Thomas & Bertolini, 2015: 141). The report did not include for instance, consideration 
of the state of the underlying economy & local property market dynamics, the state of relations 
between the public and private sector, the institutional set-up and power relations of the 
stakeholders, and the role of the municipality in making TOD and LVC attractive and viable for 
both local municipalities and developers.  
 
By considering only best practices, these studies lead to a survivorship bias; that is, considering 
only the views of those cities that succeeded, not those that tried and failed. The danger 
therefore exists that in trying to recreate these best practices, the CCT might fail to consider the 
‘unseen’ factors which lead to the success but importantly does not examine other cities failed 





“No ambiguity is evident when we view the past. Only the things that happened, happened. But 
that definiteness doesn’t mean the process that creates outcomes is clear-cut and dependable. 
Many things could have happened in each case in the past, and the fact that only one did 
happen understates the variability that existed…the history that took place is only one version 















Accordingly, for the CCT to secure meaningful private sector commitment to TOD, it must not 
focus solely on global best practise, nor on ascribing prototypical behaviours to developers. It is 
not enough to list factors that influence developer behaviour, it must also examine and 
understand how and why economic actors, in this case, developers, make decisions that they do 



























Figure 3 shows that there are four main actors in the property market, each with their own 
objectives, behaviours, motives and risk tolerances, and that these factors may at times conflict 
or align with each other. As one of the four actors, the ‘Private Developer’, as referred to in Figure 
3, is commonly understood to be the primary built environment change agent, and his/her 
interest in the development, along with the development activity, and availability of land, “are 
important conditions for transit oriented development….” Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo 
(2016:13). Despite their importance, very little is understood about developers (Adams, 
Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012) beyond their characterisation as “profit-maximisers” (Mohamed, 
2009; Morgan, 2010 and Bross, 2014) whose reactions to policy can be prescribed by policy-
makers (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012). 
  
Local government often only focusses on what the built environment should look like, without 
paying equal (or in some cases, any) attention to the developer as the primary change agent. In 
gaining a better understanding of the developer, such policies will also stand a better chance of 
shaping developer behaviour to meet policy objectives (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell,2012 and 
Thomas & Bertolini, 2015). The CCT acknowledges its shortcomings in this regard and has 
admitted that historically, developers have largely ignored the CCT’s proposed spatial policies. 
This is due, largely, to a lack of an understanding of the market, and particularly, the motives that 
drive developers (CCT b, 2016). 





Thomas & Bertolini (2015) add that TOD projects are on a delivery scale that requires stakeholder 
engagement and involvement that is often complicated and difficult for cities to implement on 
their own. This relationship, between private developers and the CCT, therefore needs to be 
explored further as both parties have little understanding of each other and have not interacted 
within a TOD paradigm before (CCT b, 2016). 
 
McIntosh (et al., 2015); Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo (2016) and Thomas et al., (2018) all 
agree that certainty for developers is a minimum pre-requisite for private sector buy-in for TOD 
implementation. Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo (2016) add that where it was found that 
transit systems stimulated land development, the stimulated development was preceded by local 
area-specific conditions that were conducive to private property development and attractive to 
developers. 
 
There is no question that property developers will be a critical group in ensuring TOD and LVC 
success, but the benefits of providing developers with certainty and other development 
incentives must be balanced against the resultant societal costs, including the entrenchment of 
current spatial inequalities that may arise from traditional formulations of what a developer is. 
1.4 Problem Statement  
Research has shown that public investment, on its own is not a catalyst for property value 
increases, and may in some instances, be a value detractor. Value detraction may arise through, 
amongst many other factors, a misunderstanding of the property market and its actors. Whilst 
the Framework recognises the role and influence that the private property market, in particular, 
the property  developer plays in determining the success of TOD and catalytic projects, the CCT 
admits that it has a “sub-optimal relationship with the private sector” (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 
15) mainly due to previous spatial policy informants that did not understand developer 
behaviour and its motives, which in turn led to anodyne policy and instrument prescripts. This 
Framework has however framed and centred its understanding of developer behaviour, and the 
property market and its motives/drivers, within a normative neo-classic economics framework. 
This lens has led to the formulation of certain tools and incentives that the CCT intends to use to 





across Cape Town and facilitate the orientation of development around transit.” (City of Cape 
Town b, 2016: 22). 
 
Morgan (2010) and Moore (2015), critique that property development and property market 
academic research narrowly centralise and isolate the developer’s role in the development 
process (without considering systemic or institutional influences). Furthermore, current property 
development research is fixated on identifying industry best practice, measuring development 
goals/outcomes and the types of tasks undertaken by a developer. The replication of studies 
such as these has led to weak academic literature on property developers and development in 
general, which has in turn, led to a weak understanding by the State of these key actors in the 
property market.  
 
 By casting the property developer in  the neo-classical economic mould, the CCT may have 
placed its faith on the application of a construct that is limited to “Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich and Developed (WEIRD)” (Sutherland, 2018: 1) investment behaviours. This 
interpretation “leaves no role for reframing a problem or anchoring a price, for providing 
guarantees or reassurances, for overcoming inertia, for signalling, for satisficing, for shame, for 
norms, for psychophysics, for choice architecture, for social proof or any of a host of perceptual 
and persuasive tools that can have a decisive effect on how people think, decide and act.” 
(Sutherland, 2018: 3). The Framework itself limits its scope of understanding of the developer: 
a) by ignoring institutional arrangements and the influence of these arrangements and b) by 
focussing on the “factors that inform their decisions and actions” (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 22) 
not the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of their investment decision-making under uncertainty and how both 
institutional and behavioural aspects (including the CCT’s behaviour) affect the developer’s 
decision-making.  
 
In adopting a limited scope of understanding, the CCT not only limits the framing of the tools and 
incentives it intends to use shift developer behaviour within a TOD context, but may miscalculate 






1.5 Research questions  
In order to address the research problem stated above, the following research questions will be 
examined: 
1 What is the depth of the City of Cape Town ’s understanding of a developer? 
2 What perceptions do developers have of the City of Cape Town and what has given rise to it? 
3 What effects, if any, will the Transit-Orientated Development Strategic Framework and other 
related spatial policies potentially have on the developer’s investment behaviour?  
4 Are there opportunities for public officials to re-cast themselves? 
1.6 Research aim and objectives 
Considering the research questions formulated above, the aim of this research is to present a 
more nuanced understanding of a notional property developer in Cape Town, thereby allowing 
for the advancement of a developer policy construct and the formulation of tools and incentives 
predicated on behaviour rather than on policy itself. 
In other words, this dissertation aims to use the TOD paradigm to explore whether the  CCT , 
understands the developer beyond “…what drives the development process or motivates 
individual developers…” (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012: 2592) simply as profit-maximisers 
and as actors “…whose occasional inappropriate behaviour could be corrected …” (Adams, 
Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012: 2592)  through policy tools and incentives. It also aims to mitigate the 
risk of TOD policy failure by understanding the private sector’s perspective on TOD and what it 
means in the sector. Ultimately, it is envisaged that this research will contribute towards 
correcting the sub-optimal relationship the CCT has identified and will reduce uncertainty and 
risk for developers looking to participate (Thomas & Bertolini, 2015) in TOD. Moreover, it aims 
to improve institutional maturity so that LVC becomes a viable funding tool for future TOD 
projects (Goliath, 2015). 
 
Accordingly, this dissertation sets out to achieve the following objectives: 
• To conduct a detailed literature review using oft-ignored frameworks and paradigms to 
view urban real estate economics, including setting out a brief overview of property 
development models, understanding property development using an alternative 
framework (Complex Adaptive Systems), conducting a deep-dive into the construct of the 
developer and its behavioural characteristics, and defining the role of the public sector in 





• To conduct qualitative research that will help establish a more accurate construct of a 
property developer, more accurate tools and incentives to shift the behaviour of the 
developer and to assist in correcting the current sub-optimal relationship that the CCT 
has with private sector actors. 
• To use the interview method to gain primary evidence, experiences and perspectives on 
the property developer in Cape Town. 
• To analyse and interpret results of the interviews and to distil key themes that will 
support the assertion that the CCT needs to re-evaluate how it perceives the developer. 
• To provide conclusions and present recommendations based on the research. 
 
1.7 Research Proposition 
The point of departure for this research is best summarised by Belzer & Autler(2002) who state 
that TOD cannot be rolled out in isolation of the lifestyles of transit users and the real estate 
market but must be cognisant of the influence that the real estate market will have on TOD 
projects (Belzer & Autler,2002 and Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo,2016.  
Thus, the research proposition is stated as follows: 
 
The current policy paradigm within which the CCT understands a property developer may not 
incentivise the developer sufficiently to act in accordance with TOD policy, resulting in the CCT’s 
failure to achieve its TOD objectives. 
 
1.8 Research Justification 
According to Scorcia & Munoz-Raskin (2017), the implementation of South Africa’s BRT systems 
was premised on, inter-alia, the expectation that BRT systems would be able to operate without 
subsidies as is the case in  Colombia. In light of the current strain on CCT coffers brought about 
by high MYCiTi operating costs (Bosch,2018), where fare revenue continues to underfund 
operating costs (see Figure 4 below), this dissertation will scrutinise the CCT’s assumptions 
around the construct of the property developer and the tools and incentives it intends to use to 





and offering an alternative based on this dissertation’s findings, the CCT may prevent further 
self-induced fiscal pressure and potential TOD policy failure. 
 
Figure 4: proportion of MyCiTi fare revenue covering direct operating costs incurred by the RBT system (Bosch, 2018) 
 
As stated earlier, LVC is being touted as one source of funding for rolling out and servicing TOD 
infrastructure. Research by Goliath (2015) and McGaffin (et al., 2016) confirms that land value 
capture is a viable mechanism to finance TOD infrastructure and fund transport operating costs. 
However, private sector developers must be confident that public transit investments will unlock 
or create property values. McIntosh (et al., 2015) cautions that TOD infrastructure on its own is 
not enough to enable public transport to vie for market share from the private automobile’s 
users money and time. Meta-analysis by Suzuki et al. (2015) and Smith, Gihring & Litman (2018) 
both demonstrate that the capitalisation of transit investments or interventions into property 
values is not axiomatic. 
 
A TOD project must achieve a lifestyle that is enticing enough, of high quality and offers 
comparative time and cost savings. This leads to an increase in the level of spend in an area, 
which in turns leads to unlocking of land-use changes and land value increases (McGaffin, Napier 






If TOD is being used as a lynchpin for directing spatial development and growth within Cape 
Town, then the CCT must understand certain principle actors of the urban development market, 
primarily the developer. Other than what TOD aspires to achieve, it can be argued that for the 
first time, the skill, effort and energy of a private developer is intertwined with the systemic 
delivery of public goods, community goodwill and opportunities for undeserved communities 
(Belzer et al., 2009). 
 
Furthermore, if TOD and the property market are intertwined as suggested by Belzer (et al., 
2009) then both public and private development actors need to understand that real estate 
values are partly dependant on any changes in development policies and real estate submarket 
dynamics (Rodriguez, Vergel-Tovar & Camargo, 2016). However, the public sector limits its 
involvement to setting and imposing policies and has conceptualised the property developer in 
an ideal world, devoid of market and economic actor realities (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 
2012). 
 
This dissertation differentiates itself from research already available in that it looks at the local 
government and the property developer nexus and seeks a more nuanced understanding of a 
notional property developer in Cape Town, thereby allowing for the advancement of a developer 
policy construct and the formulation of tools and incentives predicated on behaviour rather than 
on policy.  
 
In essence, this dissertation calls for a ‘New Real Estate’ paradigm (Lister, 2007)  to match the 
CCT’s ‘New Urbanism’. This New Real Estate paradigm must usher in a new approach to 
understanding the private property developer. This means the CCT’s new methodology of spatial 
re-ordering and targeting must be matched in new approaches to viewing and understanding the 
private property developer. 
 
1.9 Research Design and methodology 
Nine developers in Cape Town were willing to be interviewed. Based on the research questions 





structured interview method and memo-ing technique for data collection, and computerised 
content analysis techniques (Guthrie & Fan, 2016) as tools of analysis. 
 
The phenomenological strategy aims to understand a person’s point of view and the lived 
experience of a phenomena in a context-specific setting. The phenomological data is provided 
by participants and how they perceive things. This is then unpacked empirically with the 
overarching question being, “what was your experience?”. This strategy rejects the notion that 
generalisations can be made (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Groenewald, 2004 and Bell & Bell, 2015). 
 
To undertake the phenomological research strategy, the context-specific setting must be 
understood. This means probing two diametrically opposed parties in the property development 
industry: the private property developer (market actor) and the local municipality (the welfare 
actor). This dissertation will however only focus on the developer’s version of the truth and their 
world and ideas of the truth so as to stitch together a better understanding of and to construct 
the phenomenon as they have experienced it. The Framework finds itself wedged between two 
truths that still need to be explored. This dissertation will examine the truth of the developers. 
 
 City of Cape Town Developers 
Truth What truth does the City believe about 
developers and their willingness to 
participate in City-run TOD projects or 
private TOD projects. What informs their 
belief? 
What truth do developers believe 
about developing property in Cape 
Town? 
Table 1: Unpacking the truth and world view of the City of Cape Town and Developers (Abdullah, 2019) 
 
1.10 Structure of this dissertation 
The research begins with a literature review in Chapter 2, providing an overview of the current 
juncture facing real estate, and particularly property development research. It presents 
alternative viewsof: (i) the property market (institutional economics view); (ii) the property 
development process (Complex Adaptive System approach); (iii) the property developer as an 
economic actor (behavioural economics); (iv) and the reimagined roles for local government in 






Chapter 3 sets out the research methodology that will be used in this dissertation, the 
justification for using the semi-structured qualitative interview, and the strength and weaknesses 
of this approach. Chapter 4 will discuss and analyse the data found during the qualitative 
research. The dissertation will conclude with Chapter 5 which will set out practical 
recommendations and high-level conclusions based on the discussion and analysis in Chapter 4.  
1.11 Chapter summary 
This chapter has laid out that public investments in and of itself will not automatically lead to a 
rise in property values. There are many factors that must align before any public investment is 
made that will lead to an increase in private property values. One of these factors is 
understanding a primary economic actor in urban development, the property developer. The 
CCT’s current definition of a developer has been used as a basis for developing tools and 
incentives that it perceives will assist the city in unlocking property values and achieving spatial 
objectives. The dissertation questions whether such incentives and tools will be effective in 











CHAPTER 2: LITREATURE REVIEW 
 
“I don’t know why finance gets to be a department in a university, but real estate doesn’t. That 
is just a historical accident…What I am saying is you folks ought to develop your own 
real estate theory which addresses itself very much to the liquidities of the problem, and 
you want a theory that is practical”- Harry Markowitz (Bell & Bell, 2015) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There are many theoretical frameworks each competing to be the prime paradigm for 
understanding real estate, property development and property developers. The protagonists of 
these respective frameworks don’t readily realise that having diverse viewpoints on a single 
subject brings a richer and deeper understanding of the development process, the industry and 
actors alike. Each perspective adds value to the discipline by studying an aspect that is not 
normally found within another paradigm. Thus each new magnified aspect brings a new 
discovery to the relatively young area of real estate studies (Guy & Hanneberry, 2002). The 
prevalent issue with real estate research is its domination by normative and quantitative-based 
research on a subject that, as this chapter explains, is in a human and socially-weighted domain. 
Sound theoretical insights strengthens predictive powers in the field and this ultimately leads to 
better policy (Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin, 2004). 
 
The “analytical ambition” (Guy & Hanneberry, 2002: 286) of this dissertation is to showcase a 
richer view of  property developers and the local government nexus within a Transit-Orientated 
Development (TOD) framework. A conceptual framework and overview of chapter 2 is 
dematerialised in Figure 5 below with section summaries. This framework illustrates the 
analytical ambition of this dissertation and the presents a broad overview of the untapped 














2.2 Short overview of the property market economic theoretical frameworks 
Most of the real estate research has been based on quantitative and neo-classical economic 
perspective., (Coiacetto, 2001; Arvanitidis, 2006; Morgan, 2010; Knight, 2011; Drane, 2012; 
Henneberry & Parris, 2013).  
 
One potential reason for this research bias is that developers themselves do not fully appreciate 
the role they play in the urban economy. Knight (2011) found that, at least for the trader-
developer archetype, developers understand what they do within the development process but 
cannot adequately explain the role they play. Another reason for the bias is the dominance of 
neo-classical economics throughout the world. Mirowski (1992) criticises mainstream neo-
classical economics, from which real estate research takes its cue, and accuses it of ‘physics envy’ 
(Mirowski, 1992:65) in that it appropriated physical science models for the sake of legitimising 
what is essentially a study of human behaviour (Chang, 2014). 
 
Chang (2014) believes that the mainstream neo-classic school of economics has dominated our 
world because it appeals to the desirous notion of freedom of the individual, and that therefore 
market freedom is inexorably linked to individual freedom. This notion is premised on two 
assumptions, first, that there is a perfect actor, and second, that there is acceptance of the status 
quo. In other words, this notion does not question whether actors’ choices are truly rational and 
what influences their choices, nor does it acknowledge wider institutional arrangements and 
social structures and how these arrangements and structures influence actors, and vice-versa.  
 
An alternative perspective sees the property market as a fundamentally behavioural discipline. 
So, to understand the market means an undertaking to understand the processes and decision-
making of developers, space users and space facilitators (the State). Where the interests of these 
three actors intersect, this is where the built environment is formed, operated and where value 
is produced (DeLisle, 2010) or assigned (Arvanitidis, 2015). 
 
DeLisle (2010) argues that the main actors mentioned above are social creatures, thus real estate 
should not be seen exclusively from a positivist or neo-classic view. Property is a scare resource 
that changes ownership or its state through a social exercise. It is primarily through the process 





research should seek out other means (other than normative and quantitative-based research 
concepts) such as behavioural economics to understand the property market (Bell & Bell, 2015). 
 
One of the core concepts of behavioural economics is ‘bounded rationality’ and strikes at the 
heart of the neo-classical school of thought. The world is complex and uncertain and thus our 
ability to be rational is constrained or ‘bound’ by overwhelming information and the decisions 
that we need to make based on this information. In order to overcome this avalanche of 
information and uncertainty, we develop heuristics to find the optimal decisions based on limited 
brain processing power and time (Keogh & D’Arcy, 1999; Mohamed, 2006, 2009; Barros, 2010; 
Chang, 2014). It follows that contrary to what mainstream economics thinks, we do not possess 
unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower and unbounded selfishness (Kahneman, 2011; 
Chang, 2014). We are not an “omniscient economic man” (Lewis, 2001). 
 
Kahneman (2011) states that heuristics (‘expert judgement’, ‘common sense’, ‘instincts and 
‘intuition’) is a cognitive response to continuous decision-making under uncertainty and 
complexity. These decisions are made with decreasing energy and effort because with increased 
exposure to these kinds of problems, the brain produces a mental model or pattern of thought 
that aids us in making ‘optimal’ decisions, thereby also limiting our choice-sets that may yield a 
better possible outcome. Optimal decision- making therefore means using as little mental energy 
as possible as a means of self-preservation. In narrowing our choices to a pre-defined set of 
possibilities, we choose an option that is good enough, but not necessarily one that is utility-
maximising as espoused in the expected utility theory. This is also known as ‘satisficing’ (satisfied 
+ sufficing) (Simon, 1997; Barros, 2010; Etzioni, Piore & Streeck, 2010). 
 
It is in this processes of creating neural paths of least resistance to form heuristics and 
judgements (Thaler & Mullainathan, n.d.; Diaz & Hansz, 2007; Kahneman, 2011) that we also 
establish institutions to reduce uncertainty, bring a sense of order to a complex world (Keogh & 
D’Arcy, 1999; Ebohon, Field & Mbuga, 2002; Arvanitidis, 2006; Etzioni, Piore & Streeck, 2010; 
Chang, 2014b; Taruvinga & Mooya, 2016) and reduce transaction costs (D’Arcy & Keogh, 2002). 
 
National Treasury has already deployed behavioural economics in trying to understand and 





discretionary savings levels. Behavioural economics is partly responsible for the Tax-Free Savings 
Account which was promulgated in 2014 (National Treasury, 2014 and Leigh, 2015). 
 
The table below presents the dichotomy between the mainstream neo-classic economics 
approach to real estate studies- and understanding developers, juxtaposed against a richer 
institutional-behavioural economics approach. 
 
Mainstream view: neo-classical Qualities 
Richer view: institutional & 
behavioural 
“Individuals know what they are 
doing, so leave them alone- except 





“Individuals are products of their 
society, even though they may change 
it (society) later.” (Chang, 2014b: 151) 
& 
“We are not smart enough, so we 
need to deliberately constrain our 
freedom of choice through rules.” 
(Chang, 2014b: 151) 
Demand-side analysis in influencing 
the value of goods. Markets are 
constantly adjusting to state of long-
term equilibrium, leaving society in 
a better-off position i.e.: there is no 
need to be altruistic because the 
markets leave everyone, on 
aggregate, better off.  
Positivist approach: how the world 
should work 
Focus 
Actors must be understood within the 
context of the institutions, rules, 
norms, standards and societal cultures 
which mould the individual (and vice-
versa) while actors navigate the world 
and grapple with limited cognitive 
abilities.  
Realist approach: how the world 
works in reality  
Expected Utility Theory: maps 
changes in net wealth. Markets are 
considered a gathering of rational 
self-serving actors who seek only to 








Prospect theory: maps changes in 
value from a reference point. There is 
a diminishing sensitivity to 
gains/losses and Loss Aversion 
Bounded rationality & satisficing: the 
world is complex and uncertain and 
thus our ability to be rational is 
constrained or ‘bound’ by 





decisions that we need to make based 
on this information. To overcome the 
avalanche of information and 
decisions, we develop heuristics to 
find the optimal decisions based on 
limited brain processing power and 
time. People will settle for the first 
satisfactory solution (and not the 
solution that maximises utility). It is 
within this bounded rationality that 
the developer sets objectives, assesses 
his tolerance for risk, foresees the 
future and makes decisions under 
uncertainty 
Man is best placed to make 
decisions for himself to increase his 
welfare and the welfare of those 
close to him so long as it is cost-
effective. No need for government 
intervention to help make decisions. 
Imbued 
behaviour 
Man is a complex actor with layers of 
motivation behind his behaviour, 
including instincts, habit, belief and 
reason. He is susceptible to making 
decisions based on sentiment, biases, 
cognitive dissonances, etc. His innate 
behaviour is moulded by the 
institutions surrounding him. 
Quantitative-based modelling that 
aggregates nuances of sub-markets, 
themes, locations etc. Uniform 
market behaviour can be 





Underdeveloped, over reliance on 
quantitative or sociological 
formulations 
Markets are efficient: assets reflect 
all known information accurately 
and instantly, resources are 
allocated appropriately but property 
market is slightly inefficient. There 
are high transaction costs and the 
asymmetric flow of information 
when trading in property makes 





Efficiency isn’t measured by efficient 
pricing and the time taken to reach 
price equilibrium; it is a function of 
how the macro-institutional context 
(economy, political landscape and 
socio-cultural) and institutions (actors, 
organisations and networks) which 
constitutes a system, adapts to, 
anticipates and accommodates 
internal and external stresses of the 
urban economy. 
Built environment is deployed at its 
highest and best use for rational 




The market is the facilitator of 
development activity and a mediator 





priced and reflect derived demand 
in the long run, despite high 
transaction costs and information 
asymmetry. 
development interests. Property value 
is driven by heuristics, biases and 
sentiment to compensate for our 
limited cognition. Therefore the 
information used to calculate and 
inform asset prices may not be correct 
or correctly processed given our 
tendencies to react to sentiment, 
biases, cognitive dissonances, etc. 
Exists to derive the highest profit 
from an investment in providing 
space where there is demand for it 
(City of Cape Town b, 2016). Always 
and sufficiently responds to demand 
provided he or she is adequately 
compensated for the risks he or she 
will be exposed to.  Allocates 
resources to meet market 
expectations, bringing to market 
what the user demands.  
Developers 
Developers may influence the market 
and the market may influence 
developers. In other words, the 
actions of developers are in response 
not only to market movements, but 
also to shifts in institutional 
arrangements. Developers faces 
complexities but will only experience 
these when he commits to 
development, despite the best efforts 
to calculate/forecast returns, plan the 
development and foresee any issues 
arising in the future. Therefore, he is 
not a reliable co-ordinator or resource 
allocator.  
Developers readily responds to the 
market efficiently while the market 
is perfectly adjusting to supply and 
demand of real estate products. 
Property values are correctly priced 
into the product. 
Developer 
impacts 
In the long run, the reaction to market 
demands (and the perception and 
processing of market information) on 
imperfect information leads to an 
over/under allocation of resources 
and real estate products. This 
imperfect allocation leads to long-
term institutional change (the 
mediating effect of the property 
market and broader economy). 
The government won’t intervene in 
markets because rational and self-
serving actors will in the long run 
correct any short-term negativity to 
reach a new state of price 
equilibrium, leaving everyone, in 
aggregate, better off. Incentivise 




Cannot trust the market to reflect 
proper value if it views inherent 
characteristics of property as 
inefficient. The State may develop 
supportive or detrimental institutions 
for property development and break 
the hegemony of institutions that 





manner, maximises his chances of 
creating surplus value and lowers 
his profit risks. 
must be shepherded into certain 
actions based on how they treat risk 
and reward as they don’t know any 
better and struggle to align current 
behaviour with a future state. 
The dominant view: planning must 
regulate land use and building 
development and ensure there are 






There is a societal interest in having 
public interventions because unlike 
other real property (e.g.: art and cars) 
immovable property can have 
outsized negative externalities on 
society that may not be reversed or 
remediated. Political interests are 
swayed by both nomadic and local 
development cultures and vice-versa. 
The State can also influence the 
development industry structure and 
facilitate a diverse competitive or 
oligopolistic/monopolistic industry. 
Table 2: the key distinctions between the mainstream neo-classical and the institutional-behavioural approach to 
understanding the property market, property development and the State’s relation to both. (Keogh & D’Arcy, 1999; Coiacetto, 
2001; D’Arcy & Keogh, 2002; Gallimore & Gray, 2002; Arvanitidis, 2006, 2015; Mohamed, 2006; Diaz III, 2010; Etzioni, Piore & 
Streeck, 2010; Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012; Drane, 2012; Pirounakis, 2013; Alexander, 2014; Chang, 2014b; Jones, 2014; 
Waights, 2014; Leigh, 2015; City of Cape Town b, 2016) 
 
The next subsections will delve in more detail on how both institutional and behaviour economics 
separately views the property market, and by implication the property developer. 
 
2.2.1 Institutional view 
“…theory building in the built environment tends to be fragmented, under-resourced and 
explored from the limited properties of individual disciplines or interest groups within the 
construction/property industry” (Koskela, 2008: 211) 
 
Keogh & D’Arcy (1999) state that the basic premise of institutional economics is that institutions 
and actors (collectively called the “institutional framework”) emerge to bring certainty to society 
and to reduce transaction costs amongst actors by providing beliefs, perceptions, conventions, 
culture and expectations, etc. or ‘the rules of the game’. These rules mirror the interests of a 
select group that represents power within society. It is in the interest of this select group to 
uphold the institutional framework or amend it if it is in their interest to do so. This is echoed by 





mobilisation on housing affordability that New York City was “…hostage to developer interests.” 
(Fainstein, 1990: 563). 
 
Arvanitidis (2006) augments this premise by saying that the presence of institutions does not 
remove uncertainty for society because the certainty that arises from institutions only serves 
those with power and influence. This certainty also comes at the price of constraining market 
actor behaviour. According to Ramabodu, Kotze & Verster (2007), the development industry in 
South Africa reflects its socio-cultural and economic history, as well as the current political 
framework. For instance, Fainstein (1994) describes the New York development industry as 
highly entrepreneurial, strongly mirroring the aspirations of those behind it. She found that large 
projects in London and New York were driven by a particular types of developers, that possessed 
“male egos that find self-expression in building tall buildings and imprinting their personae on 
the landscape” (Fainstein, 1994: 4). 
 
It follows then that if institutions are formed in the image of groups who have power and 
influence, then these groups will co-ordinate amongst their peers to drive down intra- group 
transaction costs and allocate resources to further their interests- this resource includes political 
influence (Olver, 2019). Therefore, the property market cannot be relied upon as an arbiter of 
market value, nor can economic growth be purely driven and achieved by the property market 
in order to uplift society. Consider that developers, as a power group, may collude to fix prices, 
collectively reduce supply or lobby government to change formal rules in their favour. Uppink 
(2016) found that the Greater Tygerberg Partnership (the “Partnership”), a multi-stakeholder 
partnership to drive inclusive regeneration and local economic development primarily along the 
Voortrekker road corridor, was initially captured by private and political elites (“urban 
patronage” (Uppink, 2016: 89)). This temporarily resulted in the Partnership focusing on mega-
block projects for high-income earners while important planning and detailing of “inclusive 
transit-oriented development are missing or have not been developed nearly to the same level of 
detail as more private sector focused projects”. Moreover, “inclusive city-building strategies such 
as social and affordable housing and local economic development” (Uppink, 2016: 88) were not 
prioritized, despite inclusive development being one of the Partnership’s stated aims. While 
Olver (2019) reported that the civic groups in Bo-kaap, Observatory, Sea Point  were ‘captured’ 





Coiacetto's (2009) findings reflect and reinforce this phenomenon. He found that the 
development industry is organised as an oligopoly. While legal regulations and State actors play 
an influential role in structuring the industry, large actors with money and power possess a 
disproportionate amount of influence in structuring the property market by: 
• exploiting current legal/regulatory avenues to stifle smaller firms and may not react 
positively to exogenous factors. 
• abusing the planning approvals process by hampering or slowing it down or funding court 
action by protest groups, thus impeding competition and entrenching oligopolistic or 
monopolistic industry (Coiacetto, 2009).  
 
What this also demonstrates is that the State has a direct and indirect influence on the 
development industry structure. Onerous planning submission requirements and a reluctance to 
provide infrastructure entrenches an oligopoly structure as it precludes smaller developers from 
operating (Coiacetto, 2009). 
 
According to Keogh & D’Arcy (1999), the property market as an institution consists of and is 
positioned as depicted in level 2 of Figure 1, below. All three levels interact with each other and 
can adapt these interactions through experience and action. What is clear is that all institutions 





















Level 1: the institutional environment: the overarching political, social, economic and legal 
institutions that set the formal rules and conventions that govern society (Keogh & D’Arcy, 1999). 
According to D’Arcy & Keogh (2002), the broader institutional environment can affect 
development in the following ways: 
• Political: political risks or policy interventions may increase risk to developers or set out 
a public good which the developer must produce; 
• Social: attaches social significance to the process of property development; 
• Economic: generates supply and demand in the use and investment of property and can 
create adjusted pricing to incentivise the supply of property development; and  
• Legal: the overarching framework which dictates what is permissible or not mainly via 
planning departments but also dictates and gives effect to enforcement of private 
property rights. 
 
Level 2: the property market as an institution: the property market constitutes a hierarchy as 











ets “formal and informal rules governing the behaviour of diverse property actors” (D’Arcy & 
Keogh, 2002: 20). The rules have two primary functions; they can be either be restricting (impose 
prohibitions) or permissive (impose acceptable behaviour but only under certain conditions) 





Formal rules in the property market Informal rules in the property market 
Devised to govern conduct: professional 
bodies, agents, developers, property law, 
industry codes of conduct. 
Evolved through convention and acceptable 
codes of behaviour societal values/attitudes 
on property. Includes such concepts as the 
gentlemen’s agreement or builders’ holidays 
Formal transaction costs: development 
charges, application fees. 
Informal costs: intangible costs, misreading 
local sentiment. 
Table 3: Definition of formal and informal rules in the Property Markets (Ebohon, Field & Mbuga, 2002 and  Arvanitidis, 2006) 
 
Keogh & D’Arcy (1999), D’Arcy & Keogh (2002) and Arvanitidis (2006) agree that the property 
market as an institution is not a reliable co-ordinator or resource allocator, which means it 
cannot always provide certainty to everyone. Thus, some developers may be risk averse because 
of the uncertainty, or some may attempt to purchase certainty by bribing planning officials. In 
the long run, the reaction to market demands (and the perception and processing of market 
information) on imperfect information leads to an over/under allocation of resources and real 
Property 



















estate products. This imperfect allocation leads to long-term institutional change, resulting from 
the mediating effect of the property market and broader economy. However, this change will 
only be to the advantage of those who are in, to the detriment of society at large (D’Arcy & 
Keogh, 2002). 
 
Arvanitidis (2015) adds further that for cities, this means that their property markets are 
intrinsically linked to their economic performance (though economic performance is not 
exclusively dependant on property markets). Moreover, the property market efficiency of a city, 
in an institutional context, is where the market can adapt its structure and provide for the needs 
of economic participants, primarily, by reducing uncertainty and being sufficiently adaptable. An 
efficient property market is when both developer and user have low transaction or information 
costs, and not just developer. 
 
Level 3: Property Market Organisations: all actors within property market organisations impact 
upon property development decisions: 
• Users demand certain types of space in a certain area which then inflates property prices. 
Developers are incentivised to respond if it is worth the risk and time.  
• In the long run, the institutional environment may consist of institutional forms and 
arrangements that support or deter (knowingly or otherwise) property development 
(D’Arcy & Keogh, 2002). 
The Institutional view of the property market allows the reader to view it as one consisting of 
formal and informal rules of the game, its structuring in favour of those whom possess power 







2.2.2 Behavioural economics 
The dominant economic framework in real estate studies is neo-classical economics. Neo-classic 
economics is centralised on 'expected utility theory’, which states that an actor processes 
information  perfectly  under uncertainty leading to decisions that that will bring the highest 
expected utility (Descak, 2017). Behavioural economics has discovered many shortcomings in 
how we rationalise the world, make decisions under uncertainty, over-rely on heuristics and 
suffer from cognitive dissonance. These shortcomings lead to sub-optimal and sometimes 
irrational choices. 
 
Financial decision-making during the development appraisal phase is where most of the 
important development decisions are made. There is one central theory (developed by 
psychologists, not economists) that helps explain investment decision-making where risks exist 
and presents a counter-vailing view on how a developer may make decisions under uncertainty. 
It must be stated upfront however that using Behavioural Economics is not a panacea to 
modelling human financial decision-making, but its use adds another dimension in understanding 
and explaining human behaviour especially under uncertainty (Leigh, 2015). 
 
Prospect Theory’s (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) basic premise is that people are not striving to 
increase their absolute level of wealth but are concerned about changes to their relative wealth 
point. In other words, people are only concerned if their immediate decisions will lead to a gain 
or loss for the specific decision that they are currently facing, and not the global effect it will have 
on their wealth. Unlike expected utility theory they also do not consider whether their choices 
will maximise their utility. Actors view each decision faced under uncertainty in isolation of 







The fixation on increasing relative wealth leads to behavioural traits, mapped according to the 
graph below (Ettinger & Ettinger, 2015). 
 
 
The practical implications of viewing developers under Prospect Theory shows that developers 
may exhibit the following financial behaviour traits: 
• Diminishing sensitivity to gains/losses: a R10 gain on R20 is felt more than a R10 gain on 
R1000, even though the reference points (R20 and R1,000) increased by the same value 
(R10 relative gain) and the absolute wealth is higher at R1010, than the relative wealth 
of R30 (Mohamed, 2006). 
• Loss aversion: people feel an acute sense of loss compared to a mild sense of gain for an 
equal change in value; i.e. a R10 loss is more painful than a R10 gain. This leads to the 
actor making risky investment decisions when faced with a potential loss (to prevent 
facing the prospect of a further loss) and they become risk-averse when they are certain 
to capture a gain (to protect the prospect of gain) (Mohamed, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 8: The prospect theory value function denotes asymmetrical lines (concave and convex) compared to the 
traditional symmetrical lines of the expected utility theory graph. In expected utility theory an actor who makes 
decisions under uncertainty is risk-averse and both upper right and lower left quadrants value function is the same. 
An actor is not willing to make risky decisions when faced with the prospect of a loss or a gain. 
 In prospect theory, an actor perceives a higher value for a unit of loss (lower left quadrant) than for the same unit of 
gain (upper right quadrant). This depicts  an actor as loss-averse (as opposed to risk-averse) and implies that actors 
are in fact willing to make risky investment decisions (“risk taking”) in order to stave off the prospect of a loss (Ettinger 





Diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion are one of many behavioural biases which real estate 
actors, and by implication developers are susceptible to when making investment decisions. 
Descak (2017) lists additional biases which may go unnoticed. 
Table 4: Descak (2017) lists common behavioural biases real estate actors face when making investment decisions under risk 
and uncertainty and the impacts these have on the real estate market. It must be noted that this list is not exhaustive. 
 
Mohamed (2006 and 2009), Morgan (2010) and Bross (2014) have specifically used behavioural 
economics in their research to understand the decisions of the property developer. Their 
research will be used in the sub-section of this chapter called ‘Property Developers’. More 
importantly, their work acknowledges that developers themselves are prone to errors in 
judgement, cognitive dissonances and an over-reliance on heuristics. They also call for 
policymakers to be aware of these fundamental behavioural traits. 
 
Policymakers themselves are no less prone to the traits referred to above, recent studies show 
that “behavioural public choice emphasises how psychological biases may lead to policy errors” 
(Hallsworth, M. et al., 2018:15). Hallsworth, M. et al., (2018) thus recommend that policy-makers 
be alert to their own errors in thinking about the world and mitigate against the biases shown in 






Here, identical policies were framed in terms of gains or losses (thus invoking Prospect Theory) 
where, if policy-makers perceive the prospect of a loss of life due to a potential policy measure, 
the policymakers themselves may become more tolerable to risk and thus implement risky or . 
 
Behavioural economics is a new economic discipline that is still muscling its way amongst more 
established schools of thought. This means that it has a nascent body of knowledge and which 
Etzioni, Piore & Streeck (2010) argue is its weakness mainly because its methods of scientific 
discovery are mainly based in labs, devoid of, inter-alia, real world or institutional influences.  
 
This section has introduced a relatively unused (institutional) theoretical economic framework 
and a relatively new one (behavioural) into this dissertation’s discourse. It was shown that 
according to these frameworks’ developers may not necessarily be exclusively motivated by 
pursuing all out profits without being influenced by wider institutional influences and that their 
mental processes may not lead to such profits. The next section covers the property 





development process and explores a relatively novel approach to understanding the property 
market as a Complex Adaptive System. 
 
2.3 Property Development 
2.3.1 Brief overview of the evolution of the property development model 
A property development model attempts to depict the development process in a generalised 
representation so that model results can be repeated and studied under various conditions. 
According to Drane (2012) a property development entails (in no particular order): 
• An action that is contingent on the land dynamics on which the development is based. 
• A transition period to a new state, which includes a new value 
• Distinct sub-markets that the development process interacts with, requiring various 
specialised skills. 
• Changes which may be invisible to the naked eye, such as rezoning approvals and change 
in ownership. 
 
These characteristics add to the complexity and scope of a property development model, and 
when taking these characteristics into account, preceding models seem myopic and limited to 
theoretical frameworks and lack of exposure to actual property development actors (Drane, 
2013). 
 
Guy & Hanneberry (2002) found that preceding popular development models were mainly 
developed by non-development and non-financier practitioners, while Drane (2014) adds further 
that such practitioners view real estate through their specialisation. In conducting a historical 
study of the property development models, Drane (2012) found that property development 
models were not given much attention in academia since 1992 and where models were 
proposed, they shared little in common with real estate practitioners. Table 5 below graphically 
shows that no new theoretical model has been developed since 2012. The table also depicts the 
waning influence of both Marxist and neo-classic economics, and in its place, the rise of 
institutional and political-economic paradigms. However, the latter models were developed by 





and social theory respectively. They have had little interaction with the development actors and 
focused mainly on residential developments (Drane, 2012). 
 
Figure 10: Historical and theoretical stance Map of property development models from 1954 to 2012 (Drane 2012) 
 
 
Diaz III (2010), Knight (2011) and Drane (2012) stress that it is not that there is a total lack of real 
estate-backed academic research in these models. But rather an absence of conceptual theories 
and models based on the development practice where the practice and/or the developer is 
placed at the centre of the model. In other words, there are no models based on praxis, a 
developer as a social, rather than economic being; and the behaviour and culture of the 
developer. Drane (2013) adds that “there is a more contemporary and perhaps richer view of the 
property development process but without a contemporary model” (Drane, 2013: 11).  
 
Morgan (2010) describes the tendency in real estate literature to treat the development industry 
as a homogenous, predictable group as a “fallacy” (Morgan, 2010: 58) at an industry level, when 
in fact the size of the developer differentiates how it behaves. The City of Cape Town (CCT b, 





benchmarking. Refer to Annexure A for Morgan (2010)’s classification of characteristics of a small 
and large developer. 
 
Moore (2015) adds that qualitative researchers tend to use superficial qualitative research when 
interviewing developers, thus missing out on subtle, yet key behavioural and cultural signalling. 
Thus, when policymakers rely on this research, they formulate policy on normative-based 
qualitative research. When the same superficial research approach is used to study the 
developer in the new policy setting, equally superficial research results are produced and used 
by policy-makers.  
 
This negative feedback loop manifests in the ‘missing pieces’ of a developer construct as 
highlighted by Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012) on how the Scottish executive viewed the 
developer in relation to industry policies.  Drane (2013) concluded on Adams, Croudace & 
Tiesdell (2012) findings that the public view of the property developer “creates possibly the 
greatest comment on the coverage of the topic (the property developer and the development 
process) and its collective understanding.” (Drane, 2013: 11). 
 
Other important missing pieces are identified by Diaz III (2010), Black et al. (2003), Henneberry 
& Parris (2013) , Doak & Karadimitriou (2007) and Bell & Bell (2015). They argue that real estate 
problems shouldn’t be treated purely as a financial or mathematical problem, because the real 
estate market is a deeply human process and the mainstream frameworks lack the centralisation 
of the human actor. Academics and practitioners miss the opportunity to use insights from other 
disciplines and overlook intangible issues that are connected to property development. Real 
estate research should go beyond the analysis of numbers and step into the mind of the 
stakeholders in real estate (Black et al., 2003). Gallimore & Gray (2002) found that there are scant 
studies conducted examining how a property investor makes investment decisions within the 
wider societal context, how he or she processes information, and how rational his/her decision-
making is. 
 
Trevillion (2002) adds that positivist development models force the socially interactive 
components of property development to fit into a mathematical model. Coiacetto (2001) admits 





Karadimitriou (2007) criticise those that employ the institutional economics approach to 
property development as it lacks a solid body of theory and it is devoid of quantitative tools. 
Doak & Karadimitriou (2007) state that institutional economics “is a framework in need of a 
theory rather than a full-blown alternative paradigm.” (Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007: 213). 
Henneberry & Parris (2013) add that these models don’t account for the developer and 
development activity at a local level where local developers are “embedded within local 
institutional networks” (Henneberry & Parris, 2013: 230). 
 
In its place Doak & Karadimitriou (2007) propose a framework that can take into account the 
behaviour of actors, the inter-relationships and the deep effects networks have on the local 
context, the ecosystem, and developer culture, using complexity theory and the networks 
formed or “…webs of consumption and production…” (Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007: 216).  
 
The next two subsections will question what the property development process entails and 
applying complexity science to understand how property development fits into the property 
market and how it may influence it. 
 
2.3.2 What is property development? 
Property development is a creative and social market activity where a web (Guy & Henneberry, 
2000; Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007 and Henneberry & Parris, 2013) of participants, including land 
owners, developers, planners, contractors, local communities, wider society, and financial 
institutions (D’Arcy & Keogh, 2002) compete against disparate interests and values (Knight, 
2011), are influenced by the regulatory and policy environment (Henneberry & Parris, 2013), and 
where the end result is a built product that is a collective expression of these participants. 
Property development is based on networks of actors within and adjacent to the built 
environment, that interact (actively or passively) through a process of imitation, learning, 
adaption, evolution and extinction until the site itself is embedded within this network of actors, 
who individually and collectively, generate meaning and value for this site (Doak & Karadimitriou, 
2007). This interpretation of property development acknowledges that development cannot be 
considered in isolation of the wider social, economic and relationship dynamics (Henneberry & 






The interpretation above encapsulates property development as a deeply social exercise because 
it is through negotiations, coalitions, and relationships that a development is packaged and 
executed (Guy & Henneberry, 2000; Trevillion, 2002; Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007; DeLisle, 2010 
and Moore, 2015).  
 
2.3.3 Property development as a component of a Complex Adaptive System (CAS)- 
the Property Market 
Baptista et al. (2016) used complexity science to how study macro prudential policy changes may 
affect UK housing market. Housing is considered the largest asset class in the world and any 
changes to the housing market (as a system) will affect other sectors of society (or other 
systems). They motivate that the use of complexity science allows them to study a system 
(housing market) whose sub-systems are rife with heterogeneity. Its consist of different product 
(flats, houses, low density, high density, etc), tenures, actors (home owner, tenants, banks, etc.) 
,each group with its own behavioural traits that has a bearing on other sub-system and the 
system itself.  
 
What also differentiates the use of complexity science modelling from traditional economic 
models is the introduction of spatial properties in the model. This allows for identifying location-
dependant attributes. The breadth and depth of heterogeneity in the housing market represents 
disparate sub-system behaviour that is traditionally modelled on a universal rational 
representative agent model. The universal rational representative agent model tends to  
aggregate behaviour from a sub-system (e.g. a developer specialising in commercial 
developments) leaving the system-level behaviour (e.g.: the entire development industry) 
modelled on assumptions and heuristics or what Baptista et al. (2016) describes as “postulating 
top-down, theoretical behavioural”. Complexity science however studies different sub-system 
behaviours, its interaction with each other and allows for the study of policy impacts at a sub-
systems and system level. 
 
The property development process and its outcomes can be modelled as being part of  a complex 
adaptive system (CAS)- the property market. Development is a complex physical and an intense 
social undertaking (Guy & Henneberry, 2000; Arvanitidis, 2006; Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007 and 





systems) and involves numerous actors who must co-ordinate, compete and interact with each 
other in non-linear, multifaceted, conflicting, sequential and concurrent activities.  
 
The result of the development process is a built product that affects the built environment and 
the wider property market institution (D’Arcy & Keogh, 2002; Trevillion, 2002; Kaisler & Madey, 
2008; Coiacetto, 2009 and Knight, 2011) as illustrated by Trevillion (2002) in figure 11 below. The 
figure illustrates how the production of commercial property (‘new supply’) and local 
government’s twin role of influencing office demand and the supply of commercial land interacts 
with other sub-components within this system. The system then adapts, via feedback loops, to 
changes in the sub-systems. 
 
Ultimately, when recognising development as part of a CAS, it is an acknowledgement that no 
one agent or grouping has a monopolistic influence on the development process, whether it is 
local government and its policy tools or a development financier with low-interest rate financing 
(Productivity Commission of New Zealand, 2017). 
 
A CAS can be defined as a system (e.g.: the property market) where the outcomes cannot be 
deterministically predicted even when it is broken into its sub-systems. Below are key traits that 
define a CAS: 
 
• Non-linear interactions and tipping points: The emphasis of study must be on the 
interaction and relations of the sub-systems with each other, and external environs, and 
not the composition of the sub-systems: “Studying individual ants will never…never give 
us an idea on how the ant colony operates” (Taleb, 2016). Non-linear and tipping-point 
interactions occur where actions have a disproportionate effect on the system and where 
small changes to a sub-system may lead to a sudden change in state of the whole system. 
Think of a 0.25% increase in interest rates in an over-levered property market. Doak & 
Karadimitriou (2007) motivate that the links between the sub-systems emerge to 
produce an interconnected web of networks from within and outside the system. 
Established networks of interactions produces novel information or novel behaviour. 
Novel behaviour is also known as an emergent property (Mitchell, 2011; Colander & 





• Emergence: Novel behaviour or information that is exclusive to a network of interactions 
is a defining characteristic of a CAS. It is a property that can only be produced when the 
sub-systems interact with each other to form the system. This makes the studying and 
predictive value of these networks redundant especially when agglomerating to the 
system level. In other words behaviour of the system or understanding it in its entirety  
cannot be predicted based solely on the composition of the sub-systems (Colander & 
Kupers, 2014 and Holland, 2014). The presence of emergent properties adds to the 
unpredictability of the system:  “… the ensemble behaves in way not predicted by the 
components.” (Taleb, 2016). The popular phrase the “invisible hand” of the market 
connotes the emergent events/properties of the market (Mauboussin, 1997).  
• Feedback loops and signalling: A mechanism that gives the system its dynamic 
behaviour. Feedback loops carry the signals of key relationships between sub-systems to 
the rest of the system which will then adapt appropriately to these signals. Adaption may 
be non-linear where the rate of change over time and in response to environmental 
change differs such that small environmental changes may absolutely change system 
behaviour (Gleick, 2008). 
• Structure: The hierarchical ordering of key relationships where each level of a sub-system 
follows its own set of rules. The structure allows for each sub-system to influence a lower 
or higher sub-system level. Exogenous factors and the system itself affect the behaviour 
of the structure of the system. It is the structure of key relationships that defines how the 
CAS reacts to external forces (Holland, 2014). 
• Self-organisation: The system or network responds to changes occurring from outside 
the system boundary (perturbations) or from within the system boundary (fluctuations) 
(Colander & Kupers, 2014 and Holland, 2014). Self-organisation occurs at the system level 
and is an emergent response. Self-organisation allows the system to overcome shocks 
that the sub-system would not survive on its own, and in fact, may result in redundancy 
to a sub-system while the overall system remains stable (Trevillion, 2002 and Kaisler & 
Madey, 2008).  
 
There are various vehicles that initiate adaption such as cognitive stimulation, sharing 





a sub-system or component of the property market institution through a CAS perspective may 
assist policy makers to better understand market dynamics and mitigate against and address the 














Figure 11 above depicts the local office market as a system with fluctuations, perturbations and 
feedback loops. What is important to note, in this example, is the local authority’s influence is 
not just limited to planning and building development management but supplying commercial 
land too. The adoption of a CAS perspective of the property market does not purport to make 
development and its outcomes more predictable, but by focusing on (i) the non-linearity of 
practitioner actions and external events; (ii) openness of the development system, and (iii) the 
social dependency of networks, practitioners will change their views on what the traditional, 
closed, sequential models of development see as “unintended consequences” or “great 
disasters” (Doak & Karadimitriou, 2007: 214).  
 
Instead, CAS allows policymakers to simulate their attempts to influence development and 
developers through an informed understanding of relationships and interactions between 
actors, systems and components, and the accompanying feedback loops that are present in the 
development process (Trevillion, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 11: CCT’s potential impact on the property market (as a CAS) as a developer 





The incorporation of a social network concept within the development process contradicts neo-
classic economics which downplays social relations. In fact, Knight (2011) found that a 
developer’s social network is critical to a developer’s project pipeline: “Relationships with 
contacts are a major influence on development, from opportunity identification and planning 
consents, through to completion and sale; finance and land are often accessed via links within 
the property field.” (Knight, 2011: 15). In accounting for the social responses to or drivers of the 
development process, policymakers are able to view a change in demand for certain real estate 
products as a change in cultural desires or needs (Guy & Henneberry, 2000). 
 
The following sub-section now looks more deeply into the property developer as an actor 
operating within the Property Market. It specifically questions what exactly a developer does, 
what influences a developer’s investment decision-making, how are they perceived by the public 
sector and where do they fit in relation to policy and the State.  
 
2.4 Property Developers  
2.4.1 What does a property developer do? 
Developers have been described as having the ability to interpret and translate user 
requirements; signal acceptable parameters of risk/reward expectations (Coiacetto, 2001) or 
shape (Henneberry & Rowley, 2002) the built environment. They are the central instigator of 
change in the built environment, and can even influence the local economy (Ball, 2002). 
Developers are the drivers and co-ordinators of the property development process (Henneberry 
& Parris, 2013) or the “progenitors of changes in the physical form” (Fainstein, 1994: 4). 
 
Guthrie & Fan (2016) describe the developer as the agent for implementing the TOD vision which 
local authorities set, while Belzer et al. (2009) describes a TOD developer archetype as someone 
who is mission-driven, often a pioneer, willing to take up the risk and challenge of trying to up-
end the private automobile-centric built environment. The developer involved in a TOD project 
will be comfortable interacting and collaborating with social housing NGOs, housing advocacy 
groups and financiers. The TOD developer archetype recognises that he or she is creating long-
term wealth and public goods through their investment and development work, while remaining 





energy to the creation of TOD projects. These developers will temper the idealism of planners 
and local communities (Fainstein, 2000) to the market reality because the developer performs 
functions which the local government doesn’t have the capacity and capability of doing. They 
provide skills in entitlement, financing, planning, timing, and building (Belzer et al., 2009 and 
Goliath, 2015).  
 
The developer however does not need to possess specialist skills (such as an architect or 
structural engineer) in order to produce a real estate product, but must be capable of organising 
and directing the skill and labour of others towards his/her objectives (Coiacetto, 2009).  
 
If the developer has correctly interpreted and translated the competing user demands and 
development finance on offer, and if the real estate product’s value is greater than the costs of 
constructing it, then he derives a profit for his effort and time. The developer will continuously 
monitor the property market for opportunities to extract further profits  (Ball, 2002 and 
Henneberry & Rowley, 2002).  
 
Ultimately, and as is explained in detail in the section above titled, “Short overview of the 
property market economic theoretical frameworks”, developers respond to institutional and 
market arrangements. In altering the lens through which developers and the ways in which they 
operate are viewed, less emphasises will be placed on superficial policies that have a limited view 
of the developer’s world. Herriges (2018) noted that to exclaim that “’there are too many people 
here already. Just stop all this overdevelopment!’ is [to] look at the building of homes as the root 
cause of growth, rather than as a result of the economic forces that drive growth and make it 
profitable. To [these people], developers are the ones visibly, obviously changing the landscape 
around them in a way they don't like.” (Herriges, 2018). Now that the reader understands what 
a developer does, the next section will attempt to answer how a develop thinks and behaves. 
 
2.4.2 How does the developer think and behave? 
This section examines the thinking and behaviour of developers, by considering (i) how he or she 
perceives risk; (ii) how developer behaviour is influenced by financing; (ii) how the developer 






2.4.2.1 How does the developer perceive risk? 
“It’s the indeterminate nature of future events that creates investment risk. It goes without 
saying that if we knew everything that was going to happen, there wouldn’t be any risk” -  
(Marks, 2014: 5). 
 
The CCT’s TOD Framework lists the uncertainty of public interventions as a key challenge to 
overcoming the suboptimal relationship with developers. According to the Framework, this 
uncertainty is driven mainly by the statutory development processes (City of Cape Town b, 2016). 
The Framework goes on to note that this is a deterrent to development or is cost, thereby 
constituting an investment risk of sorts. However, the Framework fails to define how this 
uncertainty, and therefore investment risk, affects the developer, and, how it affects the 
developer’s investment decision making.  
 
Investment risk can be defined as the cause of a permanent loss of capital. A developer will 
mitigate against this risk by trying to ascertain what a future property development will generate 
in profit while considering factors that will either increase the probability of profit or decrease 
the probability of a loss. This future state should not be viewed as a fixed outcome, but as a range 























Figure 12: The future should be viewed as a range of probable outcomes, where increased risks 





Developers see themselves as risk-takers, and in most cases it is a quality that is perceived as 
innate (Knight, 2011).  The level of risk that the developer is willing to take on is primarily 
dependant on whether the development is speculative or bought/rented out before completion 
of the project. However, there are other factors considered by the developer when assessing 
risk, including, the target market, the state of the general economy, developer equity and history, 
required statutory approvals, geographic area, period of development, the state of the site, and 
the extant political power structure, to name a few.  
 
In a TOD context, risk reduction measures include a commitment to, all else being equal, 
developments along transit corridors, certainty of transit infrastructure (Guthrie & Fan, 2016), 
and high-income earners. Thus a developer will not participate in TOD projects in weak real 
estate markets, even if the project site has been granted TOD up-zoning (Belzer et al., 2009). A 
developer’s perception of TOD riskiness will change when other developers who have 
participated in TOD projects discuss their experiences in the peer network (Bross, 2014). 
 
The usual structuring of development finance means a developer does not bear direct financial 
risk if the project fails, but risks reputational damage, which will in turn limit future financing 
opportunities (Knight, 2011).  
 
According to Coiacetto (2001), larger developers don’t assume too much risk in the location of a 
property relative to smaller developers. This can be attributed to the fact that larger developers 
have more resources and capabilities to develop across wider geographic areas. 
 
Mohamed (2006) found that developers focus on one project at a time and mentally creates its 
future pipeline of developments sequentially. This requires predictable approvals processes 
which allow developers to plan with confidence. Mohamed (2006) concludes that policy should 
perhaps allow developers to group risks across projects as this will lead to lower risk aversion. 
However, this may be hard to achieve because the developer must overcome the tendency to 
mentally bracket individual projects (the developer’s mental faculty focussing on the relative 
wealth point). He also suggests that planners must have a grasp of the profit margins developers 






Technology too has influenced developer investment behaviour. Progress in construction 
technologies has led the developer to have a shorter time horizon outlook. This adds to risky 
behaviour, particularly in boom times, because the developer may see a recession looming, but 
may proceed with a development in spite of this due to the confidence of the developer  that 
the new building can be offloaded before the recession hits (the ‘Overconfidence Effect’) and 
can be sold to an unsuspecting, greedy buyer (‘the ‘Greater Fool Theory’) (Fainstein, 1994 and 
Henneberry & Rowley, 2002).  
 
2.4.2.2 How does financing affect developer behaviour? 
Morgan (2010) points out that the level of and access to development financing is a fundamental 
driver of developer behaviour. Developers seek funding to finance their property developments 
if they themselves do not possess all the required capital. There are two types of finance that 
they can access; namely, short-term financing (for land acquisition, professional fees, building 
costs and marketing costs, etc.) and long-term financing (for financing of loans). If the developer 
successfully pays off its debt, the he or she will continue to strengthen relationships with funders  
in order to finance future developments (Knight, 2011). 
 
Fainstein (1994) questions the accepted logic and influence of neo-classical economics on urban 
redevelopment. The neo-classic influence has lead scholars, and more importantly, policy-
makers to believe that the development industry will neatly respond to economic demand and 
that it is government’s role to allow legislation and bureaucratic space to meet this demand. 
Fainstein (1994) counters the notion that developers respond to market demand, and instead 
posits that they respond to the opportunity that they themselves “construct and perceive” 
(Fainstein, 1994: 18) through the belief and actions of lenders operating under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
 
Mohamed (2006) and Morgan (2010) found that easy access to capital encouraged speculative 
developments especially amongst the trader-developer archetype. This type of developer tends 
be inexperienced, unable to meet user demands and has no intention of developing long-term 
holdings. He or she is also considered a major source of property market volatility (Henneberry 
& Rowley, 2002). Fainstein (1994) discovered that cheap financing perpetuated the skewed 





recession by constraining development financing during these periods (Henneberry & Rowley, 
2002) due to added scepticism.  
 
The America context has found that the funding regime of the industry has perpetuated spatial 
inequality and the proliferation of real estate that has little or no enduring value, in spite of 
supportive TOD town planning policies in place (The Transportation Research Board & National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2004; Lister ,2007; and Belzer et al., 2009)). 
In order for developers to access funds on the capital markets, the product they build has to be 
understood by disconnected investors who can only readily understand “standardised, single-
use real estate products.” (Lister, 2007: 21). Therefore, TOD requires new real estate financing 
such as: 
• The deployment of Patient equity or Impact Funds: no defined payback period and is 
funded by more patient investors such as pension, impact or development funds. 
Lowering the cost of capital and term makes the increased construction costs more 
palatable for developers because TOD infrastructure financing and real estate financing 
are misaligned (government-based financing vs capital market-based). 
• Real Options Appraisal: TOD projects are complex in nature, but they also offer flexibility 
and adaptability to surprises in unpredictable markets. Real Options Appraisals can be 
used to value TOD flexibility and adaptability.  
• Derivatives: developers or owners of the TOD asset can use the asset to set up a derivate 
futures contract as a hedging mechanism. The developer may sell the asset before it is 
built on the futures market, thus offering liquidity on an asset that isn’t easily tradeable 
(Lister, 2007). 
 
According to Mohamed (2006), developers are also prone to mental accounting, and this further 
influences his/her  behaviour when seeking financing. Developers’ in Mohamed’s (2006) study 
found that when sub-dividing plots, developers view each subdivision individually and approach 
financial institutions in the same manner. Furthermore, once funding is granted, developers tend 
to self-impose liquidity constraints and try to limit the development envelope and features even 
if regulations are relaxed and additional features may increase the per unit premium. Thus, if a 
developer perceives regulations to increase costs, they will develop in areas outside of the policy-





The State can also affect developer behaviour through financing, 
as evidenced in the UK. Financial incentives from the State 
aimed to boost housing supply by offering a home deposit 
subsidy program to first-time buyers. Despite this, developers 
were seen to perpetuate housing inequality by not ramping up 
commensurate supply, and by not passing on healthy profit 
margins to the cost of the house for end-users, but rather to its 
private shareholders. The UK’s “Help-to-Buy” programme has 
issued ±R120.6 billion to first-time buyers to fund their deposits, 
and yet supply has not balanced out demand. Now the central 
government plans to use a multi-pronged policy approach to increasing housing supply by: 1)  
providing the local government with funds to increase housing supply (He, 2017); 2) conducting 
reform planning so that it is more facilitative toward housebuilding and re-configuring non-
residential properties for housing purposes; and (3) revaluating national or local greenbelt 
policies to release land for targeted housing sub-markets (UK Parliament, 2015). Figure 13 above, 
illustrates that since the Thatcherite years, Council houses have been dramatically culled leaving 
the supply of homes (especially affordable and social ones) to private developers and housing 
associations (who are dependent on grants from HMS Treasury) (Fainstein, 1994).  
 
Even where developers understand the merits and profit potential for TOD developments, 
financing concerns make them apprehensive despite supportive TOD regulatory incentives 
(Transportation Research Board & National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 
2004). The CCT has acknowledged the influence of financiers on the development industry and 
has engaged institutional funders and found that on the face of it, TOD may be viable because of 







Figure 13: new household formation in 
the UK against dropping housing supply 





2.4.2.3 How does a developer make investment decisions? 
“our ultimate conclusions can be influenced by a frame of reference, and because we need to 
believe in patterns, we find them where they do not exist and extrapolate into the uncharted 
dark” (Diaz III, 2010: 2) and “the market is not driven by experience or technology but by 
emotion” (Fainstein, 1994: 64) 
Inherent characteristics of the property market result in information asymmetry and lack of 
transparency, forcing the developer to make judgement calls (also known as heuristics or rules 
of thumb) which are guided by an appraisal model and market noise or sentiment (Gallimore & 
Gray, 2002 and Crosby, Devaney & Wyatt, 2018). This increases the probability of mispricing 
because investors react emotionally or price market noise into developments. Lowies & Hall 
(2016) found that South African property fund managers are also susceptible to making 
emotional investment decisions in reaction to government policy or actions. The study revealed 
that none of the fund managers surveyed experienced a positive influence from local 
government on their investment decision processes. 
 
Despite the reliance on noise or sentiment, appraisal models do not account for such factors in 
the developer’s decision-making process (Gallimore & Gray, 2002) and when aggregating 
regional markets, sub-markets or themes, these appraisal models remove the nuanced 
understanding required to successfully invest within such markets (Guy & Henneberry, 2000). 
 
Gallimore & Gray (2002) and Knight (2011) found that property developers use market sentiment 
as an important source of information which they tap into. These networks are particularly 
important for sourcing new development opportunities, planning consents approvals and 
building bridges to new geographic markets where local networks (particularly in secondary 
markets) are territorial. Gallimore & Gray (2002) add further that personal networks are called 
upon more regularly than public/private information databases, and that sentiment and market 
data are held in equal importance. Guy & Henneberry (2000) also highlight the highly social 
nature of a developer by arguing that the property investment decision is formed through an 
evolving process of negotiation and experiential learning with peers.  
 
In order to determine whether a development is worth his time and effort, the developer will 





past market performance and shapes a developer’s profit expectations. A cautious or contrarian 
developer may acknowledge the overpriced market, but may still concede and give into the herd 
mentality because his/her competitors are still developing contrary to market sentiment 
(Henneberry & Rowley, 2002 and Knight, 2011) or because he/she is confident of selling to a 
‘greater fool’ (Fainstein, 1994). This behaviour feeds user and developer exuberance and leads 
to detrimental overheating of the demand/supply dynamic (Henneberry & Rowley, 2002), thus 
leaving the development industry worse off. Fainstein (1994) found that this behaviour was not 
limited to blue chip developers and buyers only, but lenders and regulatory officials too.  
 
Unlike the financial sector, which is premised on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, sentiment is 
used alongside empirical data, not necessarily because property investors are more irrational, 
but because of the high information asymmetry and transaction (information) costs (Gallimore 
& Gray, 2002) associated with development. 
 
Bross (2014) found that there are 11 variables that influence whether a developer will produce 
affordable housing within a TOD. The primary variables are those in the “economically dominant 
group’’. If any of these factors are not to his or her satisfaction, they will look for other 
opportunities and are not willing to negotiate. In addition to the investment decision of inclusive 
affordable housing, the developer must contend with complex TOD idiosyncrasies, market 
uncertainty and volatility, unclear regulatory costs and an evolving and heated advocacy climate. 
Thus the developer will levitate towards satisficing: reduce risks while earning a satisfactory 
profit, and avoid a high-risk development (which a TOD is perceived to be) that has profit 
maximising potential (Mohamed, 2009). However, larger developers compare opportunities 
across a larger territory, ensuring a wider project selection to test investment criteria against. 
Consequently, larger developers are more able to pursue profit maximising behaviour 










group (primary group) 
Regulatory moderating 
group 
Advocacy moderating group 
Land costs Zoning requirements Neighbourhood advocacy 
Housing market conditions Infrastructure requirements Political advocacy 
Public subsidies Parking requirements Non-profit advocacy 
Return on investment Mixed-use requirements  
Table 6: factors that a satisficing developer uses to decide whether to include affordable housing in his TOD project (Bross, 
2014) 
 
Mohamed (2009) and Morgan (2010) contend that small developers who trade in residential 
properties tend to display satisficing behaviour, adhere to simple and stubborn rules and readily 
rely on past decisions as a benchmark for measuring good decision-making. Mohamed (2006) 
adds that bounded-rationality only partly explains a developer’s satisficing behaviour and that 
prospect theory enriches the understanding of the satisficing developer. It would seem then that, 
unlike larger developers, small developers will be less likely to readily adopt TOD principles to 
any of their developments. 
 
2.4.2.4 How does the developer perceive policy and TOD? 
When it comes to TOD projects, developers view it from the market perspective and tests which 
sub-market will be best served by TOD in a target area. Guthrie & Fan (2016) reasoned that 
“strong demand (not just for TOD lifestyle developments) overall and site specific advantages of 
transit access combine to make TOD… an especially attractive prospect.” (Guthrie & Fan, 2016: 
5). The developer also sees TOD projects as more complex and a niche offering compared to 
standard mixed-use high density developments (Fleissig & Carlton, 2009 and Guthrie & Fan, 
2016). When affordable housing is included in the project package, the complexity is ratcheted 
up to the point where developers conduct “brain damage work” (Belzer et al., 2009: 38) which 
the public sector cannot endure. Therefore, they first try and understand which sub-market is 
best suited to this niche development.  
 
In the United States of America, the Transportation Research Board & National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2004) and Guthrie & Fan (2016) found that developers 





TOD market in the future because they will put a premium on transit accessibility, while Belzer 
et al. (2009) found that TOD’s marketability will be underpinned by demographic and cultural 
changes. Currently walkability (to/from work and amenities) is seen as more important than 
transit accessibility (Cervero & Dai ,2014 and Guthrie & Fan ,2016) and if done correctly, walkable 
TOD developments will command a premium (Belzer et al., 2009). 
 





This includes restrictive building envelopes along transit 
ways and within dense urban areas and intense co-
ordination amongst stakeholders. There are community 
objections to intensification and densification. These is 
sophisticated use of public and private finance. 
Extra-costs Speculation leads to increasing land costs and requires 
compulsory TOD infrastructure. Alternative sources of 
financing are required. 
Table 7: TOD-specific characteristics that developers must grapple with (Lister, 2007; Belzer et al., 2009; Guthrie & Fan, 2016)  
 
Morgan (2010) states that small developers have a larger degree of location freedom in terms of 
potential project sites and can thus operate with more flexibility and develop more intensely and 
closer to the urban core.  Mohamed (2009), however found that when applying a behavioural 
economics framework, the satisficing small developer tends to move to large exurban greenfield 
developments, not because land is necessarily cheaper, but because he or she is reluctant to take 
on more complex urban infill density development. These developers prefer to employ a “cookie-
cutter” approach to exurban subdivision developments and move to areas where infrastructure 
costs and time requirements are lower. These characteristics are the antithesis of a potential 
TOD project.  
 
Mohamed (2009) suggests that to encourage densification and a reduction in upfront 
infrastructure costs to developers without requiring residents to subsidies the infrastructure, 





payment arrangement can only be allowed where densification occurs. This is like a Special 
Assessment District where infrastructure costs are recouped against the assessed value of the 
improved property but is paid back over period of at least 10 years. In this case however, the 
infrastructure is paid up prior to transfer to the first owner. The advantages of this are: 
• Where the infrastructure is of a high standard, developer profit increases marginally but 
project finance risk is decreased, and the development becomes marketable. This is 
important for TOD-type projects. 
• This incentive scheme allows local governments to redirect development to ideal. 
• That speculative purchases by the off-plan purchaser are dis-incentivised locations 
(Mohamed, 2009).  
 
However, Mohamed (2009) cautions that such a scheme will only work in a strong market 
because the costs can easily be passed onto the buyer, but in weaker markets, the developer 
may have to bear a larger percentage of infrastructure costs. 
 
2.4.3 How is the developer perceived by the public sector?  
“a fervent wish on the part of the public agencies…to get external developers involved in their 
major projects…has not served the city very well…none of these developers have performed in 
the way that they told Council they would. They promised a lot and delivered very little…” 
(Henneberry & Parris, 2013: 239) 
 
How the developer is perceived by the public sector is perhaps best addressed by asking how the 
public sector should not perceive the developer. Fainstein (1994) and Adams, Croudace & 
Tiesdell (2012) state that the public sector tends to view the developer with reverence or even 
“impresarios” (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012: 2582). There is a risk that this perception 
allows the developer’s behaviour to go unchecked and uncontested by institutions responsible 
for societal welfare. This also explains the development industry’s exploitation of this perception, 







If TOD is used as a policy intervention for property-led regeneration in weak property markets, 
then the CCT should be weary of TOD being hijacked by such ‘property-market-led regeneration’. 
Public agencies of the 1980’s in the UK and USA promoted property-led redevelopment that were 
too focused on generating surplus and ‘trickle-down’ wealth. This policy definition led to skewed 
positive impacts in favour of highly skilled professionals while increasing social and spatial 
inequality. So vast and entrenched was this spatial restructuring favouring the wealthy that its 
lasting impacts permeates time and economic cycles, and even in downturns, this property-led 
inequality cannot be not reversed. In fact, such pro-developer policies may exacerbate the 
proliferation of these redevelopment programs. As further funding is stymied by national 
government during a recession, cities will entice developers with greater incentives out of 
desperation (Fainstein, 1994).  
 
Coiacetto (2009) stated that radical policy change (such the CCT’s TOD Framework) may only 
work where its objectives are aligned to those of the development industry and added that 
planners tend to see developers as a homogenous group and thus treat them identically. Yet 
policy will affect various developers differently, by either discouraging or incentivising (Coiacetto, 
2001) them. 
 
Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012) suggest that government should adopt an institutional view 
and see the developer in relation to the State and the market. Yet it is difficult to view the 
developer in this way when the perception of the developer and the polices built around that 
perception are superficial and based on neo-classical economics (Fainstein, 1994; D’Arcy & 
Keogh, 2002; Guy & Hanneberry, 2002; DeLisle, 2010 and Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012). 
Even in the spatial modelling of the developer, his/her  behaviour and speciality is overlooked or 
neatly defined characterisations. (Morgan, 2010). These are the same shortcomings that 
complexity science tries to mitigate against when modelling human or complex adaptive 
behaviour as presented in the previous section. 
   
In the study by Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012), they found that the executive in Scotland 
viewed developers as built environment allies whose behaviour can be influenced by policy 
instruments because they have shared objectives. However, developers saw their relationship 





interesting is that their finding is implied after reading policies from the executive in Scotland. 
None of the policy documents reviewed could explicitly answer how it views a developer. 
 
Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012), Pirounakis (2013), Coiacetto (2001) and Taruvinga & Mooya 
(2016) state that policy makers should not look at property markets as a homogenous collection 
of economic actors, but rather as a disaggregated view of nomadic or embedded developer, sub-
markets, specialists, geographic spread and size, each with its own drivers, behaviours, strategies 
and dynamics towards servicing certain sub-markets.  
 
Local or embedded developers are more likely to “actively work with the grain of a city…” 
(Coiacetto, 2001: 199), to take into account community concerns, be more innovative 
(Henneberry & Parris, 2013), and be more inclined to keep heritage aspects of disused buildings 
intact (Ball, 2002). Monolithic institutional developers on the other hand, replicate 
unimaginative developments across geographies (Guy & Hanneberry, 2002 and Adams, 
Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012), and speculative developers are more susceptible to a planner’s 
influence (Coiacetto, 2001). In understanding these aspects, policy makers can tailor and 
shepherd specific types of developers and strategies to respond to policy goals. Coiacetto (2001) 
believes that there is no absolute developer typology and development model and thus policy 
cannot be developed as if one exists. 
 
A disaggregated view allows for focussed policy intervention that is cognisant of each sub-sectors 
characteristics, and an informed position places the public sector in a stronger position when 
entering into development partnerships with developers (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012). 
 
Henneberry & Parris (2013) offer a view of how the public sector actor should see the developer: 
“…socially embedded with distinct markets, composed of complex networks of actors with their 
own distinct habits and practices framed by prevailing rules and regulations of conduct.” 
(Henneberry & Parris, 2013: 230) 
 
Lister (2007) states that public perception of developers has regressed to actors who are 
“…greedy, voracious consumers of land,” (Lister, 2007: 9) and whose key consideration is that 





perception during development applications is plagued by “…scepticism, cynicism and well-
meaning but sometimes misinformed ideology.” (Lister, 2007: 9). This perception is partly the 
result of real estate products that are constructed for what the market currently wants/needs 
but are of no enduring value. 
 
When it comes to successfully 
rolling out BRT TOD, Cervero 
& Dai (2014) found that 
planners around the world 
ranked seven other perceived 
barriers to implementing TOD 
stations and corridors ahead 
of “scepticism amongst 
developers” and “weak 
market demand”. The higher 
order barriers can be 
generalised as   institutional and 
funding issues which are largely within the ambit and control of the State. The results imply the 
importance of ensuring that there is institutional alignment and funding in place before 
developing strategies or policies to address market issues. 
 
2.4.4 Policy, developers and the State 
Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012) state that public policy and its instruments are more than an 
approved regulatory agenda, they are the policymakers’ understanding, interpretation and 
construction of the world in which they operate in and how it works. Policy also helps identify 
relevant stakeholders and influencers for policy implementation. The primary tool to change 
behaviour is using either penalties or incentives. The failure of current real estate literature to 
understand the developer cascades into policy construction. In Chapter 1, Fainstein (1994) 
described developers she studied in New York and London as having a perverse form of rational 
egoism (Etzioni, Piore & Streeck 2010:390). Rational egoism is the natural drive to pursue 
improvements to a human being’s material wealth and is the dominant view of the human ego 
in economics. Etzioni, Piore & Streeck (2010) question the adoption of this view in light of the 
Figure 14: a ranking of perceived barriers to BRT TOD amongst planners 





“critical moments, people failed to respond the way one would have expected homo 
oeconomicus to respond to what economists believed were irresistible incentives” (Etzioni, Piore 
& Streeck, 2010:390). This section will briefly explore if prevailing policy construct of developers 
are also incorrectly viewed. 
 
Taruvinga & Mooya (2016) suggest that if policy makers view the property development industry 
through an institutionalist paradigm, instead of a neo-classical view, then the State can 
appreciate the deep impact structure plays in shaping the developer outlook and how intended 
policy may impact on the development industry as an institution. Ball (2002) states that policy 
makers must have a holistic view of the developer’s perspective in order not to produce reactive 
policies. 
 
Therefore, it shouldn’t surprise public officials that developers are perceived to be less innovative 
when it comes to achieving policy goals and need to be nudged into action. Where there is no 
encouragement (and in some cases coercion) poorly designed places manifest (Adams, Croudace 
& Tiesdell, 2012). Moreover, where the market perceives policy to be onerous, it will move to 
friendlier jurisdictions (Mohamed, 2009 and Jones, 2014).  
 
There are two fundamental issues with the current state of TOD policy planning. The first is that 
it does not sufficiently 1) understand the developer as a human, a fallible actor making 
investment decisions under uncertainty, and 2) no matter how supportive policies are of TOD, it 
is formulated from a private automobile user’s point of view. Preference for private automobile-
orientated regulations or incentives, such as single-use zoning, planning approvals or 
infrastructure funding on the urban periphery, increases TOD complexity, planning approvals 
processes and costs. Cities that adopt TOD in order to spatially restructure their cities need to 
overcome hundreds of years of urban growth, regulations and travel behaviour that have been 
moulded and perpetuated by private transport. Thus, a coercive local government is required to 
promote TOD (Guthrie & Fan, 2016). South African metropolitan cities need also to address 
apartheid spatial planning. 
 
Despite the existence of policies which set off price signals for an area, favours specific uses, 





maximises utility for the developer) in the development process, developers continue to make 
decisions that lead to inefficient land-uses (Mohamed, 2006 and 2009). Misguided policy-makers 
formulate policies that merely reinforced their behaviour. In a study conducted by Mohammed 
(2006), he found that satisficing developers latched onto habitual projects by developing low-
density exurban residential plots with satisfactory profit targets. This despite the policy’s 
intention to limit urban sprawl by offering enticements to densify target-areas. This is because 
policies did not address developers’ underlying concerns of minimising upfront costs and tackling 
pre-existing heuristics, biases and inertia to adapt to new strategic policy directions. 
 
The findings by Mohamed (2006 and 2009) focused on niche developers operating in a sub-
market of the residential development market. He showed the shortcomings of policy intention 
and market reality: without first understanding who the policy is intended for and their 
(cognitive) behaviour pre- and post-policy implementation, policy-makers will continue to 
scratch their heads when, at best, policy-reality doesn’t materialise as intended and at worst it 
creates negative externalities (Coiacetto, 2001; Morgan, 2010 and Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 
2012).  
 
Fainstein (1994) warns that in the wake of reduced national transfers, local government is left 
exposed to the whims of the private sector to mould the built environment in ways and places 
the public sector cannot afford. As demonstrated above, policy must be deeply cognisant of the 
actor, and must provide tools aimed at marrying developer behaviour to policy intentions. If this 
is not achieved, local governments will be forced to negotiate with developers with one arm tied 
behind its back. As explained earlier, the development industry is structured and created in its 
image, so it may continue to structure and perpetuate the issues that cities are trying to 
overcome.  
 
Therefore, it is critical for municipalities to re-equip and re-envisage themselves if they want to 
successfully restructure the spatial and socio-economic landscape using TOD. The next section 






2.4.4.1 Property and politics 
The political environment directly influences a developer’s appetite and perception of 
development risk within a city. Developer enthusiasm for undertaking projects whether, private, 
public or a combination, is tempered by the political persuasion of those in power (Ball, 2002). 
Sometimes politicians make unequal trade-offs by encouraging development to attract certain 
types of jobs to certain areas, and values revenue over all else, at the expense of 
deinstitutionalising the economically vulnerable. The literature highlighted that when searching 
for new sources of revenue, lower national transfers weaken local government’s bargaining 
position with developers and place local government at the mercy of developers, at the expense 
of society.  
 
According to institutional economics, not all social groupings will be represented fairly at an 
institutional level, and are therefore not able to set the rules of property development, especially 
if such development threatens the existing vested interests or powers of developers (Keogh & 
D’Arcy, 1999). The power group will only act on change if it is in their interest or where greater 
society’s interests are aligned with theirs. This limits property market possibilities in favour of 
those in power (Arvanitidis, 2006), thus requiring political/policy intervention if the property 
market is reticent to change or to respond to market demand, for example, for affordable 
housing. 
 
Fainstein (2000) too warns that the CCT must not be deluded that developers will toe the line in 
pursuing TOD. There is the risk that developers will circumvent the objectives of TOD and 
‘merely’ reshape suburbia without dismantling metropolitan segregation. The CCT should also 
not be lulled into thinking that bringing order to physical environs of people will bring about a 
commensurate behavioural change. The spatial restructuring required means that ideals will 
have to balance the economic expectations of private developers and investors which may lead 
to “slightly less exclusive suburbs than the ones they [new urbanists] dislike.” (Fainstein, 2000: 
12). Arvanitidis (2006) makes it clear that because the market can’t be relied upon to provide or 
break municipal segregation (the current institutional arrangement), the State must intervene 
but, because the State will be reliant on private developers, the CCT may be hampered in 
providing a sufficient level of inclusion and may not be able to cater for diverse income groups 





2.5 What is the role of the public sector in property development? 




2.5.1 Traditional Roles 
Figure 8 above illustrates the traditional role of the public sector in the property development 
industry. However further examination of its role shows that it can be a player (public property 
development), a referee (restricting and/or directing development) or a facilitator/initiator (land 
supplier or lead property-led regeneration projects). Its primary and traditional role is that of 
facilitator and referee by spurring  or limiting development through planning policies and bylaws, 
as well as providing infrastructure for future developments (Fainstein, 1994; D’Arcy & Keogh, 
2002 and Coiacetto, 2009).  
 
In South Africa, the public sector is empowered by the Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Act (SPLUMA) to carry out the traditional role. SPLUMA is South Africa’s 
overarching spatial planning and land use management legislation, implemented in 2015. It is 





under the SPLUMA legislative regime that the CCT derives its legislative mandate to develop and 
implement its TOD Framework.  
 
SPLUMA’s core thrust is to shift spatial planning and land use management from a procedural 
compliance regime (Nel & Barnes, 2016) to placing the CCT at the centre of spatial planning and 
decision-making to redress apartheid spatial planning in the city (‘substantive compliance’ (Nel 
& Barnes, 2016)).  
 
By devolving the responsibility to pursue spatial transformation and justice (Bickford, 2017) to 
metropolitan cities like Cape Town, the Act focusses on implementing principles rather than 
focussing on prescriptive procedures cities need to adhere to (Mponwana & Mpethi, 2019). The 
SPLUMA principles are: 
• Spatial justice: town planning should be limited to inclusivity of all races but also redress 
past spatial discrimination and engineering  
• Spatial resilience: the livelihood of low-income communities is more vulnerable to socio-
economic and environmental shocks and spatial plans need to be cognisant of this. 
• Spatial sustainability: legislated environmental protections must be applied to protect 
prime agricultural land. Urban sprawl, which is an unsustainable development pattern 
should be limited 
• Spatial efficiency: The use of land for development should consider optimizing resource 
use and placement of infrastructure in an efficient way.  
• Good administration: co-operative governance and transparency between all spheres of 
government. This principle is of vital importance as implementation of this framework 
requires good governance and co-ordination towards a collective vision (Mponwana & 
Mpethi, 2019) 
 
No provision is made for a scenario where organs of State may or may not be developers 
themselves (Ramabodu, Kotze & Verster, 2007).  
 
However, the public sector’s impact on developers and the industry isn’t defined by legislation 





archetype, some may see public intervention as stifling, whilst others may consider it facilitative 
(Coiacetto, 2001). Just as New Urbanism requires New Real Estate Financing alternatives 
(Lister,2007), the State also needs to reposition and repurpose its officials to operate in the new 
TOD paradigm. This section of the literature will explore what this may entail. 
 
2.5.2 Direct market influence 
In the UK, local governments have morphed into developers, taking the lead in catalysing the 
property-led regeneration programs and policies of the nineties. However, this also opened the 
local government to market volatility (D’Arcy & Keogh, 2002). Conventionally, local governments 
have only focused on stimulating property-led economic development, but this accentuates the 
boom-bust cycle where unrestricted and rapid approvals flood the market, thus leading to wild 
market swings as mentioned previously by Henneberry & Rowley (2002) and Adams, Croudace 
& Tiesdell (2012). Henneberry & Rowley (2002) add that it can also indirectly influence the 
construction sector because the lower the public-sector order book, the greater the proportion 
of orders generated by the private sector. This can add to the volatility because the public-sector 
acts as a stabilising force in the market during economic down turns.  
 
Spaans, Trip & van der Wouden (2013) warn that any direct involvement of the State in property 
regeneration projects can lead to society being worse off. If government can’t substantiate why 
it is getting involved in these projects in the first place, what its criteria for involvement are and 
how it will monitor and evaluate progress, then private actors will take advantage of 
government’s imprecise policy stance by including projects that do not fit the public investment 
criteria or objectives and lead to a proliferation of superfluous projects and more cities 
competing for the same funding. 
 
As stated earlier, the State can also influence the development industry structure and facilitate 
a diverse, competitive or oligopolistic/monopolistic industry. For example, the more facilitative 
the bureaucratic processes are, the greater the number of development entrants or the more 
onerous the development requirement, the more oligopolistic it becomes. While there are many 






2.5.3 Non-traditional roles 
Adams & Tiesdell (2010) and Henneberry & Parris (2013) argue that planners should see 
themselves as inadvertent market actors who shape and stimulate property development; 
however Jones (2014) criticises this view as “too simplistic and optimistic” (Jones, 2014: 578) 
because it ignores the power of market forces. He agrees with Adams & Tiesdell (2010) and 
Goliath (2015)’s idea that planners need to be capacitated and further embedded within what 
Doak & Karadimitriou (2007) describe as the built environment’s web of consumption and 
production. Adams & Tiesdell (2010) believe that planners may be embedded by: 
• Making use of property market information (both internal and external) that allows 
planners to track property market performance or access market signals (Jones, 2014). 
This will also display how their actions influence the market. 
• Expanding the planning curriculum to be multidisciplinary, practitioners should be well-
versed in real-estate markets and where they fit in the wider property market institution. 
The way developers are viewed by planners depends on the school of economics 
referenced. Capacity and knowledge amongst local government employees are also 
crucial for the use of Land Value Capture tools and its applicability to TOD projects 
• Accessing market-rooted networks. There has been a gradual dissolution of barriers 
between public and private sector development and as a result, both planners and 
developers will gain a better understanding of each other, and plan accordingly to trends 
that they pick up during networking sessions. Trevillion (2002) noted that one of the 
success factors of the City of Edinburgh’s project to release public land to the commercial 
property market is that it regularly held network sessions with the private sector on the 
long-term and short-term plans regarding its commercial property roll-out. 
 
Lord & O’Brien (2017) however propose that the ‘market actor’ roles proposed for planners (and 
by implication local government) should be superseded by that of a ‘market maker’, where the 
planner is seen as a “first mover or catalyst”  (Lord & O’Brien, 2017: 2) in property developments. 
For this to happen, planners must re-tool and operate within new paradigms and forge new roles. 
He points out that this new role entails moving beyond the participative planning paradigm and 
upskilling in negotiations with the developer, which should be underpinned by game theory (a 
branch of behavioural economics).  In employing game theory, planners tacitly agree that 





• First-mover problems: the launch of a major catalytic development may be beset with 
uncertainty and suspicion from the outset. Where multiple stakeholders are involved and 
where there is uncertainty, lack of trust, concerns over free-riding within a new 
partnership regime and inherent upfront risks, the State can be the first mover to “nudge 
the market into life” (Lord & O’Brien, 2017: 5) by a) being the common institution to 
engender trust, and b) formulate a regulatory framework to incentivise co-operation. 
• Coalition formulation: this is the usual solution to the first-mover issue above, but its 
resolve will be tested throughout the development period. Planning acts as a frame of 
reference and stabiliser for divergent interests which may shift as the project ebbs and 
flows. Local government must set ground rules during its formation and include 
incentives or penalties to members such that they would be worse-off if they were to act 
outside of the coalition. 
• Distribution of risk: the illiquidity of real estate and the long-term consequences of 
planners’ decisions fosters risk-averse behaviour amongst planners and influences a 
developer’s tolerance for risk. Therefore, developers will abide by the status quo even 
when contrarian interventions are required by them to respond to local markets. In mega 
developments where the local government has formed a coalition with private actors, 
authorities may play the first-mover to catalyse the development itself, but it must not 
undertake any action that will reduce liquidity of developable land, nor take on a marginal 
unit of risk that exceeds its marginal benefit within the coalition. 
 
When it comes to TOD, developers have listed roles that it would like the State to play: 
Land use regulation 
 
Supportive land use regulations for mixed-use developments, but with 
up-zoning potential; relaxed parking ratios; density bonuses for 
mixed-income developments. 
Better site planning 
and selection 
 
Transit stations and routes on its own are not TOD. Transit 
investments must be close to jobs and ‘TOD villages’ with real 




Parking is a major non-transit concern because without a grant for 
parking provision (structured or underground) the development is less 
walkable. To ensure better co-ordination between developers and 
financiers and realism amongst public agencies, the private actors 
should be brought in at the planning stages. 
Full Partnership or 
JV 
A medium to long-term deal between public and private actors who 
agree to share a balance sheet for a defined project and term. Some 





other organs of State may be an investment partner. This should result 
in better co-ordination and a balance between private benefits and 
delivery of public goods. This structure signals to the market the public 
agencies commitment to TOD, but this will only be palatable to the 
market where there is strong demand already, where a city  has an 
entrepreneurial spirit, and where there is strong inter-agency co-
operation and the recognition of the non-revenue benefits of TOD. 
Table 8: Common issues cited by developers and investors when participating in TOD projects (Belzer et al., 2009; Huxley, 
2009; Goliath, 2015; Guthrie & Fan, 2016) 
 
What is clear from the literature is that local government cannot continue to be content, nor to 
limit its roles to providing and administering effective legislation (Ebohon, Field & Mbuga, 2002) 
to support developers. They should morph into market actors, if not market makers. This 
requires a robust knowledge of the real estate markets, development process, the industry and 
networking. This will also reduce the risk of formulating misdirected spatial development policy 
and implementing myopic LVC policy and tools (Goliath, 2015).  
 





Vulnerability to the market 
Passive 
(traditional role: giving effect 
to planning and building 
development management. 
More of the same) 
Low 
Indirect through approval of use  
rights and building development 
management control. 




(burgeoning role: a developer 
of non-public uses, entering 
legal relationships with 
private companies around 
developing real estate; active 
negotiator and not just a 
planner) 
High 
Directly adds to market supply 
of developed space and  
vacancy rates.                           
 
   High 






2.5.4 Shaping development and developers via policy 
A developer’s main medium of contact with local government is during the compliance processes 
in town planning and building development. Generally, developers and the political elite see 
planning as distorting or intervening in a market-driven undertaking, yet they don’t appreciate 
the benefits planning brings to the social and environmental fabric of a city (Lord & O’Brien, 
2017). Before entering the markets as either as a player or through planning intervention, 
government must analyse the institutional influence specific developer groups have within the 
sub-markets of the property market. Those with vested interests in these sub-markets will want 
to ensure that their interests are protected during any institutional change (Uppink, 2016 and 
Olver, 2019). For instance, Leffers (2018) argues that developer influences are not only limited 
to planning decisions and political elites, but can and do shape the very legal institution and 
planning frameworks within which planning decisions are made. 
 
Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012) propose that policy-makers distinguish policies/interventions 
by the four possible outcomes they intend to influence in the development industry. The 
classification below, implies that local government needs to move beyond just providing planning 
and building development regulatory frameworks and be an active market player/maker: 
• Market-shaping outcomes: influencing developer decision-making at a macro level. This 
is done at a national level where attempts are made to directly alter the institutional 
context. For example, the introduction of new tax regime or the drafting of the Integrated 
Urban Development Framework. 
• Market regulation themes: restrict developer’s freedom of choice or manoeuvrability. 
Local governments see their primary method of influencing development through 
planning policy instruments that provide certainty and clarity (Adams, Croudace & 
Tiesdell (2012) and D’Arcy & Keogh (2002)). However, Jones (2014) warns that where the 
State tries to curtail fundamental market forces, it will merely lead to unsystematic 
development and the market will find profitable opportunities on its own terms 
(Mohamed, 2006).  
• Market-stimulus outcomes: through impacting on the financial calculations of the 
developer. Here the State may offer financial incentives or density bonuses to stimulate 





national tax instrument was used by the municipal town and spatial planners to target 
ruined inner-city precincts and corridors.  
• Capacity-building outcomes: enhancing capacity of developers to contribute to policy 
delivery or the capacity of officials to negotiate successfully with developers. Fora should 
be established so that local governments and developers can interact regularly in formal 
settings but beyond planning approval. There is ambiguity in government understanding 
of the rationale of public policy or the development industry. 
 
2.5.5 TOD policy recommendations for promoting TOD amongst developers 
“…without market momentum, planning tools are like sales with no wind.” (Belzer et al., 2009: 9) 
 
Below are some policy recommendations (over and above grounding policy in institutional and 
behavioural economics) that the CCT may implement in various forms in order to create market 
momentum: 
Reduce developer costs and create developer incentives  
Transit accessible sites may be prohibitively expensive for developers. Local government 
should assist by reducing costs, for example, through tax abatements, planning approval fee 
waivers, streamlining approvals, relaxing development controls within TOD zones (especially 
parking requirements), conferring rights within TOD zones to build appropriate developments 
and providing subsidies for affordable housing.  
Take advantage of natural alliances 
The CCT is encouraged to make alliances with entrepreneurial, small and innovative 
developers working in niche markets in local areas. TOD overlay zones should not just cater 
for large developers. 
Refrain from determinist-planning and remodel the local government actor  
Markets will only develop where there is market demand. Transit does not create markets but 
can be used to amplify and ease access to existing areas of high employment. Train and 
educate local government officials to have a sound understanding of real estate markets. 
Aim for realistic, not ideal TOD  
Implementing sustainable and equitable TOD to scale is proving to be hard in America. Only a 





TOD principles they can afford to implement. One of the main reasons that this happened is 
that public agencies had a poor understanding of the influence of market forces, thus TOD was 
a ‘boutique’ investment and was only successful where strong regional property markets 
existed.  
Create a TOD land acquisition fund to counter land speculation 
The fund can be capitalised by organs of State, specialist impact investors, and philanthropic 
organisations to buy land in and around stations and corridors to heed off land speculators. 
The fund can offer revolving low-interest loans to finance the sale of the land to affordable 
housing developers.  
New real estate financing for New Urbanism   
Other than LVC, public agencies should catalyse low-return-long-term funding sources 
(‘patient capital’) to support small-scale, high-density developments; value TOD developments 
using Real Options Analysis and derivatives. 
Build TOD 3.0 
Transit investments must be aligned with real estate development potential so that TOD can 
generate corridor-wide liveability benefits using corridor-wide financing tools. 
Incremental development and diverse interests 
TOD infrastructure must be planned to accommodate future incremental developments. 
Promulgate the use of non-profit entities to create alignment amongst small-scale property 
owners towards incremental development. The entity should mitigate against the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’: where one owner invests but does not control investment/timing of other owners 
with the effect that nobody contributes towards development. 
Reframe TOD to ‘TOD Districts’ (TODD) for financial sustainability 
Manage a TODD as an extended precinct where infrastructure costs can be recouped using 
LVC at a district level. These funds should be ploughed back into the district, but only in respect 
of TOD-related investments. For example, by increasing liveability benefits (structured parking, 
amenities, etc.) or funding feeder bus servicing. Establish corridor-based governance. 
Leverage the capital markets to stimulate the affordable housing sector 
While beyond the competence of local governments, National Treasury should consider a 





mortgage rate low within this sub-market.  Alternatively, the mortgaged securities purchased 
by National Treasury can be for any development within TODDs only. 
Seek out alternative alliances 
To help mitigate against community resistance to TOD and or affordable housing, local 
governments must allow affordable housing advocacy groups to propagate the benefits and 
need for affordable housing in suburban communities. These groups are more adept at 
communicating, connecting and allaying community angst, whereas developers are being 
distrustful. Advocacy groups should team up with faith-based organisations which have strong 
social currency within suburban communities and are perceived as more trustworthy and 
credible than affordable housing advocates. 
Specialised, purpose-built TOD laws 
Government should not rely on current, automobile-based legislation that is retrospectively 
applied to a new urban growth paradigm. 
Table 10: A list of policy recommendations to promote TOD delivery by private developers (Belzer et al., 2009; Fleissig & 
Carlton, 2011; Bross, 2014; Guthrie & Fan, 2016)  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This literature review has highlighted that real estate generally is not well researched nor 
properly understood beyond a positivist approach. State-based policy approaches have taken its 
cue from these mainstream positions. Denzin & Lincoln (2013) warn that this type of approach 
to understanding the world caters for a certain type of science, one “…that silences too many 
views.” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011: 19). The literature review aimed to carry out a rich, detailed 
study of the developer. To this end, the literature review has positioned property development 
as a deeply social process embedded within the property market. It also offered an alternative 
view of the property market and the developer through the complex adaptive systems, 
institutional and behavioural economics frameworks respectively. In keeping with the need for 
a paradigm shift in how property development is perceived, new roles for local governments in 
the property development process were explored as the static and traditional roles are 
inadequate for a city looking to roll-out TOD. Lastly, this chapter laid out the experience of 












CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Research of the built environment is strengthened when new and unique knowledge is added 
and accepted into or replaces the existing built environment body of knowledge. The discovery 
of such new and unique knowledge is achieved through appropriate and rigorous use of research 
methods, methodologies and the application thereof (Amaratunga et al., 2002). It is therefore 
important that the built environment researcher formulates a clear and academically sound 
research methodology. The methodology chosen for this dissertation was centred around the 
research objectives, requirements and research questions (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Creswell, 
2018). It is for this reason that the qualitative research approach was selected. 
 
“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative 
research consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These 
practises transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including… 
interviews, conversations… and memos to the self…this means that qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011: 3). 
 
A good qualitative research attempts to build a rich detailed picture of a complex landscape or 
situation. This means relying less on normative (“cause-and-effect” and “how the world ought to 
be”) generalisations and instead probing complex interactions of relationships and the meaning 
of those relationships and concepts (Creswell, 2018).  
3.1 Research Requirements 
Over and above the merits of using the qualitative research methods, it is the research 
proposition, objectives, questions, and the researcher’s world view that dictates the research 
methodology. Indeed, the structuring and framing of the research problem reflects a particular 
interpretation of how the world works (Silverman, 2013).  Bell & Bell (2015) state that there are 
numerous approaches to gathering information and knowledge and that the epistemological 





Real estate research is currently skewed towards quantitative-based research and policy 
interventions that conveniently describe or account for phenomena in understandable units of 
measurement such as R/m², sale price, interest rates, vacancy rates, etc. (Guy & Hanneberry, 
2002; Bell & Bell, 2015). This type of research does not provide and add depth and/or context  
(Moore, 2015) to property development literature, nor does it adequately examine the processes 
which drive urban growth nor the actors that enact such processes (Morgan, 2010).  This research 
tendency also precludes other views of the same problem from being explored, ventilated and 
compared, such as the structuralism lens, or institutional and behavioural economic frameworks.  
 
The research requirements for this dissertation must include a deep probing of world views, 
meanings and experiences, not the “‘black box’ mathematical formalism” (Morgan, 2010: 205) 
prevalent in current property development research. The research requirements for this paper 
must include a deep probing of world views, meanings and experiences, not the “‘black box’ 
mathematical formalism” (Morgan, 2010: 205) prevalent in current property development 
research.  
 
The research requirements are aligned with DeLisle's (2010) and Bell & Bell's (2015) assertion 
that “…properties do not make deals with each other, people do.” (Bell & Bell, 2015: 310) and 
thus calls for more attention to be paid to understanding the influence that social-spatial 
interaction and networking has on a local property market (Moore, 2015). This can only be 
achieved by using qualitative research methods.  
 
In line with the behavioural economics theoretical framework, Mohamed (2006, 2009); DeLisle 
(2010); Morgan (2010); Bross (2014); Drane (2014) and Bell & Bell (2015) view property market 
participants as human actors who possess particular views, individual fears, desires, histories, 
and cultures, amongst others things. Each of these characteristics influence their investment 
decision-making process. These behavioural traits need to be studied and/or acknowledged 
when conducting real estate research because this is what drives quantitative results (Bell & Bell, 
2015). Thus, the positivist and neo-classical economics approaches, which aim to “control and 
predict phenomena” (Frankel & Devers, 2000: 114), are not always relevant or appropriate when 
trying to understand an innately social actor (property developer) during a social exercise 





The research proposition is stated as follows: 
The current policy paradigm within which the CCT understands a property developer may not 
incentivise the developer sufficiently to act in accordance with TOD policy, resulting in the CCT’s 
failure to achieve its TOD objectives. 
3.1.1 Research Questions 
The following research questions will be examined: 
 
1. What is the depth of the City of Cape Town ’s understanding of a developer? 
2. What perceptions do developers have of the City of Cape Town and what has given rise 
to it? 
3. What effects, if any, will the Transit-Orientated Development Strategic Framework and 
other related spatial policies potentially have on the developer’s investment behaviour?  
4. Are there opportunities for public officials to re-cast themselves? 
 
The research questions have been partially answered by way of the  literature review, which 
reveals that in the TOD context, a new paradigm is needed when it comes to how the State 
perceives and constructs the property development industry and its actors as an institution. 
Furthermore, the literature review also reveals that the perception of the future role of public 
officials and the municipality must be expanded when it comes to TOD. 
 
However, to fully answer the research questions, the dissertation must also consider the 
developer’s perception of the CCT, what informs this perception, the relationship between local 
government and developers, and their rules of engagement. Lastly, the dissertation will also 
explore if CCT officials need to be re-cast in a role that is conducive to TOD projects 
 
The sub-sections that follow will set out how this Dissertation will answer the research questions 
and achieve the research objective using the qualitative research approach.  
 
3.1.2 Research aim and objectives 
Considering the research questions formulated above, the aim of this research is to present a 





for the advancement of a developer policy construct and the formulation of tools and incentives 
predicated on behaviour rather than on policy itself. 
 
In other words, this dissertation aims to use the TOD paradigm to explore whether the the CCT 
as an organ of State, understands the developer beyond “…what drives the development process 
or motivates individual developers…” (Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell, 2012: 2592) and as actors 
“…whose occasional inappropriate behaviour could be corrected …” (Adams, Croudace & 
Tiesdell, 2012: 2592)  through policy tools and incentives. It also aims to mitigate the risk of TOD 
policy failure by understanding the private sector’s perspective on TOD and what it means in the 
sector within the context of LVC.  
 
Ultimately, it is envisaged that this research will contribute towards correcting the sub-optimal 
relationship the CCT has identified it has with the general private property market (CCT a, 2016) 
and will reduce uncertainty and risk for developers looking to participate (Thomas & Bertolini, 
2015) in TOD. Moreover, it aims to make LVC more operational for future TOD projects (Goliath, 







3.2 Research Paradigm and Interpretive Framework 
A researcher’s gender, upbringing, education, religion and ethnicity all influence his/her 
worldview. These innate and unseen characteristics dictate how and why research is undertaken 
in this Dissertation and why a research methodology was chosen. The table below lists the 
researcher’s philosophical beliefs and assumptions of the world: 
 Definition Enquiry Viewpoint 
Ontological 
 
Ideas and biases of 
how the researcher 
perceives the world 
and how it should 
function.  
What is the nature of 
the researcher’s 
reality? 
The researcher’s view of the 
world is based on ‘relativism. 
Laws are created by people 
to fit their vision of reality. 
This leads to a world of many 
truths where the facts 
depend on the viewpoint of 
the observer. The paper will 
report on the multiple 
realities that exists between 
developers and the CCT.  
Epistemological 
A specific set of 
questions that the 
researcher wants to 
explore and have 
answered. Getting 
as close as possible 
to the participant’s 
construction of their 
knowledge. 
 
How does the 
researcher know this 
reality? What is the 
nature, origin and 
scope of knowledge? 
Drawing from the ’social 
constructivist/ 
’interpretivist’: reality does 
not exist by itself, it is 
constituted and given 
meaning by people. The 
focus of this research is 
therefore on meanings, 
beliefs and thoughts of 
developers who are involved 
in development in Cape 
Town. 
Methodology 
How does the 
researcher go about 
answering the 
research question? 
What is the process 
of the research? 
The qualitative and 
idiographic methodology will 
be used to obtain data from 
participants’ senses. The 
social (the Paper presents 
literature which justifies why 
property development is a 
complex social undertaking) 
world can only be 
understood by obtaining 
first-hand knowledge of the 
subject under investigation. 
The Paper will develop 






Table 12: the philosophical assumptions made by this dissertation (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Groenewald, 2004; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011; Creswell, 2018). 
 
The philosophical assumptions listed above underpin different world views and leads to 
interpretive framework(s) that are applied to understand this world. The frameworks used are a 
combination of the ‘social constructivist’ and ‘transformative’ frameworks: 
 
• Social Constructivist Framework:  aims to understand how the CCT understands the 
developer, and through the developer’s perspective, how the development industry self-
identifies. This framework also aims to understand what a developer and the industry 
mean for the CCT, what informs this view, and what are the implications of this view when 
it comes to developing the TOD Strategic Framework. Using this framework, the 
Dissertation also aims to understand what meaning the developer ascribes to TOD, and 
what the developers overall experience has been developing property in Cape Town. By 
forming these views of the local property development industry, a rich subjective picture 
is constructed. The aim is to construct the participants’ world view, keeping in mind the 
researcher’s own background and views on the research questions (Creswell, 2018). 
• Transformative Framework: Creswell (2018) criticises the Social Constructivist 
Framework because it falls short of spurring individuals and institutions to improve upon 
the status quo. He states that knowledge is held and applied by those that hold societal 
power (in this case, the CCT and developers) and is contingent on the relationships which 
are built upon this power (developers funding political parties, think tanks and media 
campaigns, for example). To break the hold of societal knowledge (i.e. that developers 
know what is best for the urban real estate market), new knowledge must be constructed 
outside of the bounds of institutional arrangements to help role-players (CCT employees 
who deal, negotiate and interact with developers) and thus improve society (in this case, 
through the successful implementation and rollout of TOD through respective public and 
private developments). Research conducted using this framework usually includes 







Below is a table of the broad research methodological goals devised according to the interpretive 







• To understand how the developer perceives the CCT 
and what gave raise to these perceptions.  
• To understand the relationship between developer 
and CCT from the developer’s perspective. 
• To determine how and why developers make 




• To ensure that the CCT adopts a pragmatic, less 
obsequious and richer understanding and view of 
the development industry. 
• To ensure that TOD is successfully incorporated in 
the urban fabric of Cape Town without undue 
financial burden placed on CCT. 
• TO ensure that CCT officials are adequately 
equipped to deal with developers outside of the 
typical town planning and building development 
management context. This is particularly important 
when structuring deals in TOD catalytic projects. 
Table 13: the broad research goals formulated under the adopted Interpretive Frameworks (Creswell, 2018) 
 
3.3 Research Strategy & Design 
Nine developers working on or involved with development projects within Cape Town were 
willing to be interviewed. Based on the philosophical paradigms discussed in the previous 
section, the interpretive frameworks adopted, and the research questions and objectives the 
research strategy most suited to this Dissertation is the phenomenological strategy. This strategy 
informed the research design, which entails: 
• a field survey of developers using the localist semi-structured interview and memo 
technique for data collection (Guthrie & Fan, 2016) 
• documentary analysis using the NVivo computerised content analysis technique as a tool 
of analysis.  
 
The phenomenological strategy aims to understand a person’s point of view and the lived 





Cape Town within a TOD context.  The phenomenological data is provided by participants’ senses 
which are empirically unpacked. The overarching question of this strategy is “what was your 
experience?”. This strategy rejects the notion that generalisations can be made (Amaratunga et 
al., 2002; Groenewald, 2004; Bell & Bell, 2015). 
 
This Dissertation will however only focus on the developer’s version of the truth, their world-
view and ideas of the truth to stitch a better understanding of what the phenomenon is that they 
have experienced.  
 
 City of Cape Town Developers 
Truth What truth does the City believe about 
developers and their willingness to 
participate in City-run TOD projects or 
private TOD projects. What informs their 
belief? 
What truth do developers believe 
about developing property in Cape 
Town? 
Table 14: Unpacking the truth and world view of the City of Cape Town and Developers (Abdullah, 2018) 
 
3.3.1 Interview Protocol 
The literature covered in Chapter 2 motivates that the property market and by implication 
property development is underpinned by social relationships, networks and roles, and that 
therefore property development should be studied as a social exercise. Pursuant to the research 
questions and objectives, research paradigm and strategy, the semi-structured interview was 
chosen as the data collection method to support the qualitative approach taken.  
 
As stated earlier, a good qualitative research attempts to build a rich detailed picture of a 
complex landscape or situation. This means relying less on normative (“cause-and-effect” and 
“how the world ought to be”) generalisations and instead probing complex interactions of 
relationships and the meaning of those relationships and concepts (Creswell, 2018).  
  
The interview method allows for in-depth probing of social roles and real and perceived relations 
that are woven into the development context (Moore, 2015). Creswell (2018) describes an 
interview as an instrument used to “unfold the meaning of their (participants’) experiences, to 
uncover their lived worlds” (Creswell, 2018: 3).  For this Dissertation, the localist semi-structured 





engagement, because it would be “naïve to assume that that relevant issues are always on the 
surface.” (Qu & Dumay, 2011: 251). This method also allowed for flexibility to the local context 
and for grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes and events. The primary 
purpose in this Dissertation was to unearth the research topic from the perspective of the 
developers operating in Cape Town (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Qu & Dumay, 2011).  
 
When applied to this Dissertation’s research context, the interview method is appropriate  
because the construct of the development industry and the developer within the official strategic 
framework document describes the property developer in no more than three lines (City of Cape 
Town b, 2016) and the developer’s perception of the TOD Framework has not been studied. 
 
Furthermore, there were nuances that were only discoverable when interviewing developers, 
where in an interview, being “an exercise in power and communication” (Moore, 2015: 402),the 
researcher holds the power (Qu & Dumay, 2011). A researcher must try to uncover insights about 
the developer by: 
• Being mindful of what the participant said compared to how they answered, and by 
taking note of long silences or implied answers. “It is critical for the interviewer to 
read between the lines and pay attention to hidden messages or ambivalence.” (Qu 
& Dumay, 2011: 251). (Qu & Dumay, 2011; Moore, 2015). 
• Being aware of impression management by the developer, which signals a need by 
the developer to conform and comply with dominant socials norms and the perceived 
preferences of others. Neutrality was emphasised when asking the developer what 
the researcher’s position is on the research topic/question (Moore,2015). 
• Considering that the developer may well mirror and bring into the interview setting, 
the behaviour of the development industry’s power and influence on the built 
environment landscape.  
• Ensuring that the interviewer steer the focus on the meaning of the interview results 
instead of trying to force the interviewee to be truthful. 
Methodological impact on the research process and outcomes 
Moore (2015) also cautions researchers that tend to assume role-playing either to extract 





layperson. This behaviour highlights the fixation on finding answers to dominant social questions 
without looking more closely at what informed the answers to these questions. This fixation 
leads to normative prescriptions so that the current conditions are improved upon. This 
mainstream approach would be adequate if the research goal was to ensure legal and policy 
compliance, but this approach won’t uncover the dominant culture of the development industry. 
Without being made aware of the dominant culture and what drives it, policy-makers will 
continue to use a shoe-horned conceptualised developer archetypes (Moore, 2015). 
 
Interviews were conducted individually so that each participant is comfortable in the interview 
setting and so that his/her opinion on the questions were not dominated/influenced by another 
participant. All participants were assured of privacy and confidentiality (please refer to approved 
ethics clearance Annexure C) so that answers could be as honest and forthright as possible, which 
is important when developers are being critical of CCT officials and vice-versa. A link to the nine 
interview transcripts is provided for in Annexure D. 
3.4 Research data collection method and analysis 
The decision was taken to interview one of the two protagonists in the property development 
process: namely, local developers. One party formulates polices and sets the rules of the game 
(CCT) and strives to change the urban fabric of the city, while the other delivers real estate 
products and operates within this institutional set-up (property developers). Interviews were 
conducted at the offices of developers.  
 
To strengthen the case for a polythematic approach to constructing a ‘notational Cape Town 
developer’, each interview session was preceded and closed by a common behavioural economic 
question that indicates loss-aversion tendencies and susceptibility to framing (Ettinger & 
Ettinger, 2015). While certainly not a rigorous undertaking, it will show if developer participants 
are as susceptible to behavioural biases as the rest of us. As stated in Chapter 2, there are many 
cognitive flaws in how we make decisions under uncertainty and in the presence of risk. 
 
The answers to the behavioural questions were only shared with the participant if he/she 
requested it. This saved time and protected any egos from being bruised, which may have 





3.4.1 Local Developers – General profile of the developer’s chosen 
The nine developers interviewed were selected based on their embeddedness within the local 
economy. These types of developers are more likely to be amendable to participating in TOD 
projects, especially in partnering with the CCT (Guy & Henneberry, 2000; Coiacetto, 2009; 
Henneberry & Parris, 2013). One of the interview participants had been shortlisted as the 
preferred developer in the Foreshore Freeway project. It must also be noted that the chairperson 
of the Western Cape Property Development Forum was also selected as an interviewee as his 
views represent property developers as a lobby group in the Western Cape. 
 
The general profile of the developers chosen were those that prefer high-density, mixed-use 
developments for the market and within the urban core. Prior experience with TOD or TOD-like 
projects was not a requirement. Developers that are registered as Social Housing Institutions 
under the Social Housing Act of 2008 were intentionally excluded as their products are not sold 
or rented on the open market. The four broad themes that were covered in the interview are: 
• Professional background and personal background 
• Understanding of the role and purpose of local government in property development 
• Understanding of private property development and how it relates to policy 
• Insight into the understanding and comprehension of the TOD Strategic Framework 
• Redefining the role and skills of CCT officials 
 
Annexure D has a link to the transcripts for all nine interviews.  
3.5 Research data analysis method 
The use of code in qualitative research is a bridge, or “transitional process” (Saldaña, 2013: 5), 
between data collection (interviews) and  the interpretation or explanation of that data. Thus, 
coding for qualitative research is not a precise science, but an “interpretive act” (Saldaña, 2013: 
5) based on a slice of someone’s world.  
 
Coding essentially looks for patterns in text by assigning a code that has a meaning to a string of 
text, categorising the same codes together along with the underlying string, thus linking what at 
first seemed like disparate interview responses under a single category. This is how emergent 





attention to what participants say and reflect deeply on emergent patterns and the meanings of 
participants. 
 
When constructing codes and categories, data (the lived experiences, world views, truths, beliefs 
and meanings and exposure to the complexity of the mind) cannot be neatly and discretely 
bounded by these codes and categories. Furthermore, language used by participants, their 
constructs and ideas of the world are housed in the responses. Therefore, a diligent researcher 




There are however shortcomings to this phenomenological strategy and interview method which 
was mitigated as follows: 
Shortcomings  Mitigation 
Answers are limited to the questions asked.  
 
Use the localist, semi-structured interview 
approach. Researched questions will act as a 
guide to conversation aimed at uncovering 
world views and meanings that are consistent 
with the Paper’s research questions. Questions 
will start out as broad and general, but as the 
conversation on each theme evolves, it will 
become focused. 
Semi-structured approach may lead the 
interview to veer away from the research topic 
and questions without either party realising it. 
The interviewer must be readily adaptable to 
changing interview setting and conversations. 
Involves abstraction by the researcher because 
they did not live through the experience. 
 
The researcher is a CCT employee who interacts 
daily with colleagues who deal with developers, 
has worked in the development industry, and is 
in regular contact with developers. 
The type of questions, tone of researcher and 
general social ambiance of the venue may 
negatively affect the interviewees disposition. 
 
Interviews are to be conducted in a setting 
where interviewees are comfortable, at a 
convenient time for participants, and where 
parties are comfortable to voice criticisms of 
both sides should a participant from either side 
be offended by a question. It will be done in 
strict confidence and the interviewer will make 
it clear that they should answer the questions on 
their own terms. 
Interviewer-interviewee relationship bound to 
be influenced the age, gender, biases, 
background, ethnicity of each participant.  
Employ reflexivity: dissolve the personal 
motivations for undertaking this research. Strive 
for forthright conversation by preparing well for 
the interview. The interviewer must display a 





have to say and a systematic effort to really hear 
and understand what people tell you.” (Rubin, 
2005: 17) 
Different world views may exist between 
researcher and participant, which opens room 
for ambiguity and different cultural meanings, 
even if the same words are used to describe the 
same event or process. 
The researcher must have a deep understanding 
of the research topic and possible world views 
that may exists within the topic. 
Table 14: shortcomings and mitigating tactics for the phenomenological research strategy using the localist semi-structured interview method. 
Adapted from (Qu & Dumay, 2011; Bell & Bell, 2015; Moore, 2015 and Creswell, 2018). 
 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics clearance has been obtained, having addressed the Ethical Considerations satisfactorily. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out this researcher’s world view and how the research questions will be 
handled and motivated what the most appropriate research methodology is. It is clear from both 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that property development research is awash with quantitative-based 
works while this Dissertation has consistently highlighted and called for the use of more complex, 
qualitative-based methodologies. It must be stressed however that it is not in the built or 
property environment’s interest for one methodology to have a research hegemony. The best 
outcome is where the built or property environment research regularly employs both 
methodologies (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Guy & Hanneberry, 2002). 
 
The research methodology formed in Chapter 3 ensures that the research hypothesis and 















CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 
This dissertation focuses on the developer’s world view and experiences with the City of Cape 
Town (“CCT”). This focus is not indicative of biases towards developers, but is to build a rich, 
nuanced understanding of a notional developer in Cape Town by conducting in-depth 
discussions with these actors. The aim is to build a foundational view of one side of the spatial 
development coin. Ideally, an equally in-depth research report should also be carried to build 
the world view and experiences of the CCT staff who deal and negotiate with developers daily. 
The semi-structured localist interview method was used to satisfy the research methodology. 
The use of double quotation marks in this discussion denotes the actual speech of 
participants.  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse and discuss the transcripts from the interviews. This dissertation is 
premised on trying to gauge how the CCT has understood and defined a Cape Town property 
developer within a Transit-Orientated Development (“TOD”) context. 
 
A critical input into such a definition of a Cape Town developer is also dependant on how and 
why developers perceive the CCT in a particular manner. This chapter will begin by giving a 
brief profile overview of developers interviewed and then examine key themes that are 
distilled from the interviews. This section will also analyse the overall perception of the CCT, 
using positive and negative perception labelling of an interviewee’s transcript. The underlying 
rationale of Chapter 4 and 5 isn’t that the CCT should adopt one model of a developer over 
the other, but to illustrate the richness and usefulness in deploying several economic 
frameworks to conceptualise a richer construct of a property developer, one that may 
respond readily to CCT edicts. 
4.2 General profile of developers 
A total of nine developers were interviewed for this dissertation. These are developers that 
can be considered entrenched in the development landscape of Cape Town and are likely, all 
things being equal, to participate in public-led catalytic projects, or are likely to pioneer 
private TOD-orientated real estate products. Interviewees have had at least 15 years’ 
individual development experience in Cape Town, have built and operated mixed-use 





million, and/or hold a portion of what is developed for long-term portfolios (these portfolios 
are at least R100 million and some range up to over R1 billion). These developers generally 
have a core team of built environment professionals who focus on deal sourcing, land 
assembly and packaging, master planning, costing and project managing. External consultants 
are brought in to ensure that phases are completed or where deep specialist skills and 
knowledge are required. 
 
One participant is a professional project manager who has been involved in numerous multi-
billion Rand developments in Cape Town on behalf of developers and large institutional 
clients, while another participant is a professional development master planner and manager 
who also represents the Western Cape Property Developer’s Forum. Seven of the developers 
interviewed specialise in the Cape Town/Western Cape regional market only, and two of the 
nine operate on a national scale. Of the seven local developers, one participant is a developer 
within a listed Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”), focussing on the Western Cape, while 
another participant represents a mixed-use precinct whose shareholders consists of a listed 
REIT and a pension fund respectively. 
 
Quotes from interviewees will be attributed to each developer with their assigned interview 
number e.g. Developer 1 is denoted as “D1”. 
4.3 Institutional approach to defining property developers 
Developers are aware that wider institutions and players within the institutional 
arrangements play a leading role in influencing their behaviour. The following influential 
institutions were consistently mentioned: 
1. The centrality of the economy and property market institutions: Interviewees were 
clear that Cape Town’s property market cannot be dictated to by the CCT and its 
policies. It is the market that ultimately dictates the developer’s overall sentiment. 
This sentiment comprises of inter-alia a developer’s appetite for risk, a funder’s 
appetite to lend, opportunities, perceptions of optimism and pessimism, and fellow 
developer actions. CCT policies and instruments play a supporting role in affecting the 
developer’s sentiment and therefore his or her investment decisions. The TOD 





acknowledging that incentives will only be effective if the impediments to market-
stimulation of well-located land are development-related and within its control. 
However, “if the area is poorly located, the use of incentives will result in development 
that distorts the market and will require long term support in order to remain viable” 
(City of Cape Town b, 2016: 64). 
 
2. Political & administrative institutions: Developers understand that political ideology 
and a political climate of the administration sets the agenda and tolerance for 
property projects. Ideally, politicians and senior management must set the vision for 
where it wants the city to be and must then allow the private sector to navigate 
towards that vision.  
 
The overall view of participants suggests that the constraints imposed by the ‘rules of the 
game’ mould developers into highly entrepreneurial mind-sets that find ways to create value 
“in spite of” (D7) the bureaucratic forces that they are subjected to. However, participants 
have not denigrated the constitutional role that the CCT plays in the development process 
(representing and facilitating the views and interests of society), but rather the way the CCT 
has been fulfilling this role.  
4.4 Behavioural approach to defining property developers 
The preceding section laid out the wider institutional influences the respondents may be 
exposed to. This section examines how the nine participants self-identified compared to how 
the CCT has defined the developer within a TOD context. While some agreed with the CCT’s 
stated definition of what a developer is, others didn’t. This highlights the nuances that exist 
within the local developer community regarding how developers behave and how they self-
identify.  
 
Chapter 2 introduced the reader to the behavioural economics theoretical framework and 
how it can be used to describe the how and why a developer makes investment decisions 
under uncertainty. One of the core concepts from this theoretical framework is in applying 
‘bounded rationality’ (rationality is limited by the tractability of the decision point, the 





satisfactory and sufficing solution instead of an optimal solution.) and the formulation of the 
’satisficing developer’ (decision-maker strives for adequate rather than perfect results, a 
pragmatic developer that chooses to rather save on costs (monetary, opportunity, mental) or 
expenditures). These two core concepts are woven into sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 below. 
 
Table 5 below draws out the main themes of the Framework as it relates to developers. The 
table format allows for easy comparison of how the CCT defines a developer according to the 
themes and how developers self-identify according to the themes. The questions in the first 
column are not the research questions but formed the basis for the conceptualisation of the 
property developer as contained in the literature.  Column 2 contains direct quotes from the 
Framework, except for italicised remarks by this author. The direct quotes are used as the 
basis for conceptualising how the CCT views the property developer. Interview results will 
first be discussed in the following sections and the main findings of each section will be 







explored in Chapter 2 






A developer’s principal goal is to derive the 
highest profit from an investment, which 
can be achieved through the acquisition 
(purchase) and disposal (sale) of property 
or financing the development/ 
redevelopment of new space. 
 
They do this by identifying the demand in 
the property market such as demand for 
space to work in, to operate businesses 
from, to live in and spaces for leisure or 
recreational activities (Isaac, et al. 2010), 
determining its 
financial feasibility and finally by embarking 
on a process of development. 
 
It is critical to note that no private sector led 
project will get built unless it yields a return 
on investment or receives a public subsidy 
to compensate for underperformance 
(Belzer and Autler,2002).  
 
Each developer is unique and will likely have 
his or her own profit benchmark, which is a 
function of cost and income and will ideally 











The Framework mentions that developers 
may perceive TOD as a financial risk in areas 
where there is low market demand. The 
Framework also: 
• states that the goal of a developer 
“is to maximise profits (factors that 
increase income) and minimise risk 
(factors that reduce costs).” (24). 
• acknowledges that uncertainty 
arises from public interventions, 
driven mainly by the statutory 
development processes. 
16 & 24 
1.3) Differentiation Each developer is unique and will likely have 
its own profit benchmark, based on their 
cost and income projections. 
 
This statement does not acknowledge that 
each unique developer will also have a 
concomitant risk profile to his or her profit 
benchmark. 
24 





The Framework lists normative factors that 
developers use to make investment 
decisions i.e.: the “key informants”. Market 
indicators include ”vacancy rates, property 
values and rental returns, infrastructure 
availability, costs, certainty and timing”.  
 
It adds further that the CCT will employ 
incentives “to change the behaviour of 
economic actors or influence their decisions 
to achieve specific outcomes,” but only in 
well-located areas with latent demand. 
 
These informants and indicators explain 
“what” is considered by a developer when 
making an investment decision. 






1.5) How do developers 
perceive TOD? 
Developers and investors may find it 
difficult to conceive that TOD can be 
profitable particularly in areas that lack 
market demand. There is a perception that 
TOD involves higher risks and costs than 
other types of development. 
16 
Table 15: TOD Strategic Framework's conceptualisation of a Cape Town Property developer (City of Cape Town b, 2016) 
 
The following sub-headings list and discuss the various characteristics of the conceptualised 
developer that were uncovered while interviewing developers. 
4.4.1  Self-perception of participants 
Developers self-identify as actors responding to the underlying invisible hand of the market 
(emergent trends) and legislation & policies (institutional signals) until it becomes unfeasible 
to do so. They navigate through these changes, building in anticipation of and according to 
the perceived signals of the economy and society. The real estate product which developers 
produce is an interpretive message that they relay back to society. If developers correctly 
interpreted these signals, their message will be well-received (a fully bought or let 
development).  
 
Two participants who have actively engaged with the CCT in trying to improve relations 
between the development industry and the CCT have alluded that developers are unfairly 
targeted by society when wider macro & micro economic (market signals) forces converge 
with failing public policy and service delivery (the wider institutional changes). This sentiment 
can be summarised by a quote by Herriges (2018) that speaks to the misperception by the 
public and policy-makers that developers are the source of spatial discontent, albeit in the 
context of economic growth: “‘There are too many people here already. Just stop all this 
overdevelopment!’ is looking at the building of homes as the root cause of growth, rather than 
as a result of the economic forces that drive growth and make it profitable. To them, 
developers are the ones visibly, obviously changing the landscape around them in a way they 
don't like”.  
 
The quote and the message by Herriges (2018) above may contribute to what one participant 





acknowledgement of the low-scale tension between the two parties. The definition implies 
that “these guys (developers) are bastards” (D5) and that “they (developers) are just here to 
screw us (CCT)” (D5) and/or the end-user because developers are not necessarily in the 
business of providing long-term quality real estate products but as simply wanting “to make 
a quick buck and then they are out of here.” (D3).  
4.4.2 Centrality of risk 
“Having an ‘edge’ and surviving are two different things: The first requires the second. As 
Warrant Buffet said: ‘In order to succeed you must first survive.’”  (Thorp, 2017, sec. 
Forward) 
 
The ‘golden relationship’ i.e.: the risk/return relationship is mentioned in the Framework but 
downplayed when defining the developer as mentioned in Table 15 (rows 1.2 and 1.3). The 
Framework also excludes a definition of what risk is to the developer or what materialises 
should a risk-event occur. These aspects are addressed in Chapter 2 of this Dissertation. 
Certainly, from the conversations with participants, none of these developers will consider 
developing what may be a ‘maximum profit’ development if the risks outweigh the returns of 
the project. Many factors were mentioned in Chapter 2 (‘How does the developer perceive 
risk?’) that increases or decreases a developer’s perception of risk (the risk temperament).  
 
The session was pre and post-faced with behavioural (‘warm-up’ and ‘warm-down’) questions 
(adapted from Ettinger & Ettinger,2015) that relate to risk. Their answers suggest that the 
presence of risk plays a critical role when developers make decisions under uncertainty. Not 
all developers interviewed put profits ahead of risk, some place risk at the centre of their 
decision-making. The centrality of risk in their decision-making is underpinned by the 
definition of what materialises if a risk-event occurs; namely, the permeant loss of capital 
(refer to 2.4.2.1). It therefore makes sense that, before a developer can think about 
generating profits, they must first ensure that the probability of outcomes and the payoff it 
brings is in their favour. Instead, the CCT misdirects its attention of who a developer is by “… 
focussing on…the developer’s eyes on profits” (D3) and that “nobody really respects the risks 
that the developer has got to take when he decides” (D3) to develop because “…for us, it is 






Considering the centrality of risk (a permanent loss of capital) in a developer’s investing 
calculus, this Dissertation looks briefly at how a developer may make investment decisions 
under uncertainty. The warm-up and warm-down question results suggest that some 
interviewees may be prone to inconsistent investment decision-making when the prospect of 
losses loom.  
 
Table 16 below shows that the investment parameters of both hypothetical property 
developments were the same, but investment outcomes or scenarios were merely framed 
differently, even though both developments would have the same net effect on their absolute 
wealth points. The outcomes were first framed as a loss before conducting the interview 
(warm-up question), and later framed as a gain to conclude the interview (warm-down 
question). The Scenarios for each warm-up and warm-down are labelled as Risky Scenario 
(Scenario A) or Safe Scenario (Scenario B).  
 






Hypothetical property development: You are assessing a development which will have an all-
inclusive cost of R4m that may bring in a gross R2m profit but, due to lack of other development 
opportunities, deal structuring, and unforeseen economic circumstances are forced to choose facing 
either of the following scenarios once the development is complete: 
 





50% chance of losing 
R1m and a 50% chance 
of losing nothing 
Risky scenario: 
Scenario A 
Investment outcome  
50% chance that you are 
left with R1m and a 50% 
chance that you are left 
with the R2m 
Net change in 
absolute wealth 
point after project 
completion 
R1.5m (-0.5 x R1m – (-
0.5 x R2m) 
Net change in 
absolute wealth 
point after project 
completion 










Investment outcome  
you are left with R1.5m 
with certainty 
Net change in 
absolute wealth 
point after project 
completion 
R1.5m (R2m – 
R500,000) 
Net change in 
absolute wealth 
point after project 
completion 
R1.5m 
Table 16: scenario parameters of both warm-up and warm-down questions from which developers had to choose 
 
As Table 17 below shows, if developers were, as the Framework implies, perfect decision-
makers that are only required to take into account the “key informants” (City of Cape Town 
b, 2016: 24) then they would have answered the warm-up and warm down questions 
consistently. Instead, five of the nine developers were willing to take on the ‘risky scenario’ 
when the investment outcome was framed as a loss (warm up), but only two of the nine were 
willing to take on the exact same ‘risky scenario’ when the investment outcome was framed 
(warm down) as a gain. This result is consistent with Prospect Theory which is discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 
This inconsistent investment-decision making is ascribed to loss-averse behaviour when 





tendency to strongly prefer choices that result in an avoidance of loss instead of a choice that 
may lead to a gain. A loss-averse tendency leads to a developer’s risk temperament increasing 
in order to make the risky investment more palatable to prevent the possibility of a loss. The 
modulation of risk tolerance that changes on the perception of losses/gains suggests that 1) 
developers may also be susceptible to behavioural investment biases and 2) risk, not profit is 
the “lynchpin in the decision-making process” (French, 2001: 399). 
Table 17: Certain developers exhbit loss-avoidance tendancies (Abdullah, 2019) 
 
The ‘warm-up’ and ‘warm-down’ questions in itself are not in any way an empirical method 
for constructing a notional Cape Town developer, but the behavioural answers certainly make 
the case that behavioural economics should be (albeit not exclusively) used when developing 
a ‘notional Cape Town property developer’.  
 
Loss-aversion and framing ‘misbehaviours’ are one of many misbehaviours that humans are 
susceptible to, but are two that play an important role in affecting investment decision 
making under uncertainty. Descak (2017) and Hallsworth (et al., 2018) list many others that 
are relevant to the property market and government policy formulation respectively. 
Developer  
Warm Up (outcomes framed as a loss) 
Warm Down (outcomes framed as a 
gain) 
Scenario A - chose 
the RISKY scenario 
with an uncertain 
outcome 
Scenario B - chose 
the SAFE scenario 
with a certain 
outcome 
Scenario A - chose 
the RISKY scenario 
with an uncertain 
outcome 
Scenario B - chose 
the SAFE scenario 
with a certain 
outcome 
1  B  B 
2  B  B 
3 A   B 
4 A   B 
5  B  B 
6 A  A  
7 A   B 
8  B  B 
9 A  A  





4.4.3 The Satisficing Developer 
“So, ja, I don’t agree on the highest profit, certainly for a profit” (D7) – responding to the 
CCT’s definition of a developer pursuing maximum profits 
 
The concept of the ‘Satisficing Developer’ (Mohamed, 2006 & 2009; Morgan, 2010 and Bross, 
2014) was introduced in Chapter 2. Interview results show that some developers self-perceive 
to be satisficers and not maximisers who pursue “reasonable profit” (D5) and not “stupid 
(maximal) profit” (D5). 
 
When assessing which developments to pursue, developers will assess each opportunity 
according to key metrics, some of which are defined as “market indicators” in the TOD 
Framework  (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 24). These metrics measure inter-alia, probabilities, 
payoffs, duration, cash flow projections, implied and explicit opportunity costs and the risk 
profile of the development itself.  
 
This points to certain developers seeking satisficing profits, not maximum profits, because if 
they blindly pursue a project that is projected to produce maximum profits, then the risk 
associated with such project would be inconsequential. Developers also possess the ability to 
apply second-order thinking when appraising a project. That is, the developer doesn’t look at 
the projected profits in isolation from the institutional surroundings.  
4.4.4 Regulatory-induced uncertainty and complexity tightens their Bounded 
Rationality 
 
When asked if they would prefer a shortened development timeline (time incentive) 
compared to a profit-maximising incentive (e.g.: zoning overlay or density bonus), all 
developers interviewed chose the time incentive. The delays and uncertainties brought upon 
by the current approvals system is perceived as so financially punitive that any profit-
maximising incentive won’t necessarily catalyse development within spatially targeted areas. 






These uncertainties and complexities also influence a developer’s rational projection of the 
future through Bounded Rationality. Bounded Rationality manifests where the world is 
complex and uncertain and thus our ability to be rational is constrained or ‘bounded’ by 
overwhelming data and the decisions that we need to make for the future are based on this 
data. In order to overcome the avalanche of information and decisions, we develop heuristics 
to find the optimal decisions based on limited brain processing power and time (Keogh & 
D’Arcy, 1999; Mohamed, 2006, 2009; Barros, 2010; Chang, 2014). Contrary to what 
mainstream economists think, we do not possess unbounded rationality, unbounded 
willpower and unbounded selfishness (Kahneman, 2011; Chang, 2014). We are not an 
“omniscient economic man” (Lewis, 2001).  
 
As confirmed by the Framework, regulation has hindered’ ability to make rational investment 
decisions due to the increased complex regulatory regime and the uncertainty (such as delays 
during the approvals process) that this regulatory regime produces.  
 
This either deters them from developing in Cape Town (City of Cape Town b, 2016) or they 
choose to undertake a project that presents the least mental burden and uncertainty 
(provided profit thresholds are met). Such a project is one that a developer is used familiar 
with, one that continues to perpetuate the status quo, and one that would become 
burdensome if TOD principles and expectations are applied to it. Alternatively, a developer 
will expect a higher return from the increased risk.  
 
Throughout a project’s duration, the developer arrives at countless decision-making points 
where each decision is made in anticipation of what the future holds. To assist the developer 
in making sound decisions, they require certainty and simplicity from the CCT so that their 
bounded decision-making process can be focussed on the conceptualisation, construction & 
marketing of processes and the development pipeline. The more confident they are in 






4.4.5 Potential developer archetypes 
The Framework states that “Each developer is unique and will likely have its own profit 
benchmark.” (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 24). Each developer may be unique, but they can be 
classified into certain broad archetypes, similar to what Morgan (2010) has done in 
differentiating between a large and small developer’s behaviour (See Annexure A), or to 
McGaffin, Spiropoulous & Boyle's (2018) differentiation between two fundamental micro-
developer archetypes. As shown in Annexure A, there are many criteria that can be used 
differentiate developer archetypes based on upon certain characteristics. Below are a few 
characteristics that separate developers from each other, and which will result in different 
sociological and financial developer expectations. 
4.4.5.1 Investment Horizon 
The Framework doesn’t differentiate between a developer who will hold the asset beyond 
the end of the construction project and one that will on-sell immediately (or ‘flip’) on the 
market. This will have profound policy implications as a developer who intentionally holds will 
have a greater incentive to participate in nodal, local or precinct management plans, have a 
longer-term outlook and lower immediate profit expectations. The difference between the 
holder and on-seller developer archetype is said to breed “two different cultures” (D5) of 
investment expectations. 
 
A developer who intends to hold a portfolio or participates in large-scale place-making is more 
likely to view themselves as creating lifestyles. This type of developer creates large-scale 
environments that contribute towards a certain lifestyle. However, this lifestyle needs to be 
cultivated over the long-term and is facilitated by the developer. This cultivation requires 
long-term commitment by the developer who has the temerity and financial resources to ride 
out market cycles and exit the development when the lifestyle has been entrenched. Whereas 
a developer who looks to on-sell would want to recoup all his or her costs and take profits or 
‘exit’ the development as soon as possible before the market demand changes or the unsold 
units starts draining his or her financial resources. 
4.4.5.2 Developer size, financial and intellectual capital 
The Framework does not differentiate between a small/micro developer, the type of large-





small/micro developer will have a different depth of intellectual and industry knowledge and 
type of industry network. Morgan (2010) provides an-depth differentiation in key behaviours 
between a small/micro- developer and a large one (See Annexure A). The differences in risk 
temperament manifests in the type of developments they are willing to undertake.  
4.5 Perceptions of the City of Cape Town 
This section will discuss the results of how interviewees viewed the administration of property 
development in Cape Town. This theme comprises of two sub-sections: 1) perceptions of the 
approvals system and 2) perceptions of TOD-related policy. 
 
Coding analysis using Nvivo 12 was carried out to gauge the overall perceptions interviewees 
have of the CCT. The coding was split between positive and negative perceptions respectively. 




Table 18: results of coding perceptions of interview participants 
 
The table above reflects the cumulative count of perceptions per developer. 
 
It is assumed that the informants of the 126 negative perceptions have come about due to 
their negative experiences of interacting with the CCT during and after projects. The Western 
Cape Property Development Forum (WCPDF) has already engaged with the CCT since about 
2016 in trying to iron out these negative experiences and to remediate issues listed in the ‘Car 
Park’ list of issues shown below, in conjunction with senior leadership of the Planning & 
Building Development Department. It is believed that momentum for this programme has 
stalled due to current upheaval at the political leadership level. This illustrates the 
institutional influences exerted on the development industry. It must be stressed that the Car 






Yet despite the negative perceptions of the CCT, developers see ample development 
opportunities within Cape Town. Using the JSE as a proxy, it is found that while there are a 
many international regionally-focussed listed property companies (REITS and non-REITS), 
there are only a handful of domestic regionally-focussed listed property companies, each 
either focusing on the Western Cape or Cape Town. 
4.5.1 Perceptions of the approvals system  
The findings of this Dissertation have, in addition to the issues listed under the Car Park, 
identified other concerns of developers as indicated by the red rectangles Table 17, that may 
derail the successful implementation of TOD in the Cape Town. These additional TOD-related 
issues were raised consistently throughout the interviews. These are policy consistency, local 
and national political stability, multidisciplinary implementation terms, public acceptance, 





Figure 14: List of issues, problems and opportunities identified by stakeholders in 2016 and reflected in responses of this 
dissertation's interview session (Western Cape Property Development Forum, 2016). This list is consistent with the findings 






























The TOD paradigm is yet to be implemented throughout the city, thus making it impossible to 
extract developer perceptions of the approvals system within a TOD context. The perceptions 
of the current approvals system paint a picture of what developers may experience in a TOD 
context should the current system be left unchanged. The systemic issues found during the 






Figure 15: Critical success factors identified by Thomas (et al., 2018) that interviewees have expressed the CCT has 





The built environment industry and the construction industry has changed “dramatically” (D3) 
since 1994. Today developers have access to hyper-mobile capital, contend with frequent 
changes in end-user trends, and use a range of specialists fixated on specific building 
components. This has placed greater importance on the role of a project manager who must 
co-ordinate and lead a group of professionals towards a single objective. The question then 
arises as to whether the local government system has kept up with these dramatic changes 
in the industry.  
 
Local government officials have been described as “creatures of statute” (D5) which denotes 
that their existence and purpose is firmly rooted in legislation, their rigid approach to property 
development, and that officials reflect the legislative regime of society. Developers 
understand that officials exist to counter-balance the developer’s interest with “matters for 
the common good and the community’s interests in being protected from any adverse 
impact” (City of Cape Town d, 2018: 4) during a development application. Developers also see 
CCT officials’ roles as that of providing guidance on the future spatial growth of Cape Town 
and to create a predictable environment for them. Below are the common positive and 
negative perceptions of CCT officials that were given during interviews:  
 
Positive perceptions of officials Negative perceptions of approvals system 
Chose to make a difference Lack of knowledge and basic understanding 
of property and land economics  
Technically competent and knowledgeable 
within their domains 
Under-skilled when dealing/negotiating 
with developers 
Readily available for consultations and input Overstretched, under resourced and always 
in demand 
 Work in stressful and pressured 
environments 
Stifling and aloof attitude. Heritage officials 
especially (Heritage Western Cape) are 





Lack a sense of customer service. Too 
focussed on ensuring compliance 
Operate in silos 
Poor appointments at senior level, highly 
knowledgeable but not skilled to manage 
and lead people. 
Table 19: common positive and negative perceptions of the City of Cape Town (Abdullah, 2019) 
 
The lasting impression that developers have of the approvals system can be summarised by 
“I don’t think it is over-regulated. I think it is poorly regulated” (D6). The perception of a poorly 
regulated and poorly applied system has resulted in the following perceived systemic issues. 
The numbers in brackets link back to the Critical Success Factors listed in Figure 15 above that 
is required for the successful implementation of TOD: 
• The mind-set of officials is largely the product of the bureaucratic system and 
processes. There is no apparent training or effort to understand property market 
dynamics, leading to a narrow focus when dealing with applications (9, 15 and 16);  
• Lack of upfront parameters (other than zoning schemes) which dictate what can and 
cannot be built, particularly about heritage and road schemes (1 & 15); 
• Inconsistent, vague, ambiguous, arbitrary and sometimes personality and discretion-
driven interpretation of policies and legislation (1 & 15); 
• Built environment officials are not properly empowered “by the system” to make 
decisions. This breeds differential and risk-averse decision-making (16); 
• The land production process is an open opportunity to “exploit” (D7) the public 
participation processes and object for the sake of objecting (11); 
• A fragile system powered by politics. Instability at the political level cascades and 
disrupts an already uncertain, lengthy and exhaustive approvals process, particularly 
for major CCT-led property projects (1, 4 and 5). 
 
Three of the critical systemic issues listed above will be elaborated on in further detail below. 
These are the (4.5.1.1) narrow focus on compliance and the rigidity with which policy and 
legislation is applied, (4.5.1.2) ambiguous policy parameters and inconsistent application 





4.5.1.1 The narrow focus and rigidity 
According to developers, the CCT and its officials are rigid in how they view a 
development application and narrowly focus on compliance issues only. This makes 
officials ill-equipped to deal with major development proposals or proposals that 
imbue creativity. A participant who submitted a proposal for the Foreshore Freeway 
project described the lack of skills (beyond town and transport planning) amongst 
officials as a “fundamental problem” (D3). In fact, so fundamental is the problem 
perceived that their proposal recommended that the CCT form a special task team 
with whom they can liaise. This signals a lack of faith in the wider human resource 
base of CCT’s built environment officials to deal with what was supposed to be a TOD 
catalytic project.  
 
Interestingly, most developers interviewed all seem to agree that other developers 
don’t have the skills to negotiate or interact with CCT officials, although one developer 
added that if developers cannot adequately negotiate or interact with officials “…they 
(developers) go out of business” (D6), thus signalling the critical dependence of 
developers on the CCT. 
 
Developers are of the view that policy-makers should approve plans that include 
development flexibility where the developer needs to “plan for cars now, but we need 
to be able to convert that (parking) to an alternative use” (D7). This will be an 
important feature of initial TOD proposals. 
 
4.5.1.2 Ambiguous policy parameters & inconsistent application 
The interpretation and application of policies by officials is described as ranging from 
inconsistent, lacking confidence, unsure and incoherent, to ambiguous, arbitrary and 
sometimes personality and discretion-driven. This adds to the developer’s risk 
premium because there is no consistent prescribed framework that they can base 






This is perceived to arise from instable and even incompetent leadership at head office 
level that cascades down to the district planning offices where, depending on the 
leadership and culture (being either pro-development or anti-development), policies, 
frameworks and legislation may be interpreted differently where “a conforming and 
a non-conforming application is a breadth hair apart and it depends on the individual 
behind the counter and that is not good enough” (D5). 
 
To compound matters, developers view policies as being drafted and left open to 
interpretation by both developers and officials alike, where each diametrically 
opposed actor “has an ideal of the world” (D5). There is greater clarity from officials 
who operate in the engineering services (hard sciences) than from the ‘softer’ 
disciplines such as urban designers and heritage practitioners. When there is clarity, 
the developer is less likely to have a differing opinion if officials can base decisions and 
inputs on ‘hard’ policy. Some participants also raised concerns over the perceived 
influence of politicians in the either the statutory applications process itself or rushing 
to release high-profile CCT land without first consulting the private sector. 
 
4.5.1.3 Public Participation process 
The general perception of officials is that of being stifling or aloof and this is 
compounded when 1) the public participation process becomes a publicised event. 
Officials then tend to err on the side of the public who, ironically, may not share or 
understand the long-term vision set by the TOD Strategic Framework and the 
Municipal Spatial Development Framework;  and 2) officials seem to frown upon 
flexible, market-contingent approvals because they themselves cannot comprehend 
the long-term behavioural or market changes occurring within a local area that a 







4.5.2 Perceptions of TOD-related policy 
The general sense from developers is that policy-making is done in a void “without (market) 
context” (D3) and “due consideration” (D3) of market actors when it should be informed (but 
not influenced) by market realities (including the views of the developer) and that policy must 
have the ability to adapt with such market realities.  
 
Developers expect the CCT to set the high-level vision and then create an enabling 
environment for a developer to build towards this vision with absolute clarity and consistency 
in the application of policy and by-laws. Participants understand the role the CCT must play 
in the industry and why the industry is subjected to prescribed regulatory frameworks. 
 
Developers cautioned the CCT against the misinformed view that incentives will automatically 
lead to development. This is a view shared by Taruvinga & Mooya (2016) and discussed in 
Chapter 2; namely, that a simple carrot-and-stick approach will not work if policy-makers 
adopt, which the CCT has, the neo-classical economics interpretation of economic actors. The 
TOD Framework lists the Urban Development Zone (UDZ) as one of many available incentives 
(carrots) that it presumes will influence developers’ decisions to achieve TOD spatial 
outcomes.  
 
The Urban Development Zone (UDZ) offered tax rebate incentives to the developer within a 
designated UDZ. This incentive was proclaimed by national government in 2004 and targeted 
secondary property markets or down-town areas that were identified as in need of 
redevelopment and regeneration. Allemeier (n.d.) states that a CCT study showed that “less 
than 7% of development applications between 2004 and 2009 took advantage of the UDZ 
incentive – regarded as a low take-up” (Allemeier, n.d.). Here the market signal was clear that 
developers “…will still go where the market tells me to go.” (D5), or “…where the demand 
is…” (D9). It can be inferred that during that study period, the market signalled that it was not 
feasible to develop in those designated areas, despite the UDZ incentive.  
 
If TOD projects don’t make any commercial sense or are perceived as too risky, then 





catalyse development in and of itself, they catalyse the latent demand of an area. Where no 
demand exists, no development will occur. 
4.5.2.1 Transit-Orientated Development 
Developers unequivocally support the TOD concept however they did not seem to possess an 
in-depth understanding of what it represents for the city. Many who acknowledged having 
heard of it and knowing of it, have a simplified understanding. Most understand it as 
encouraging development and intensifying and densifying of uses along transit corridors. 
 
The CCT will face an uphill battle in attaining buy-in from the development industry if certain 
“building blocks” (D3) are not in place. These building blocks will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 5. Those that had a more in-depth understanding of the TOD Strategic Framework 
acknowledged that partnering with the CCT is a key success factor because of the prohibitive 
costs for developing TOD-type assets. 
 
A few participants have raised their scepticism about the longevity of TOD in the city. Its 
perceived by some to be aligned and driven by individuals and not embedded within the CCT 
itself. This opens the notion of TOD as being at risk of collapse should these champions leave. 
This scenario has led to TOD being reduced to a “bureaucratic” (D5) or “political throwaway” 
(D8) term used by the CCT to attempt to manage spatial growth rather “than an actual 
philosophy of what needs to be implemented.” (D8). 
When asked if there has been talk amongst their peers of TOD, many responded that there 
hasn’t been much talk; however, one developer (D6) quipped that the reason could be 
because if they have identified opportunities within a TOD context, they would rather keep it 
to themselves. 
4.5.2.2 Catalytic Projects 
One developer suggested that for large-scale TOD ‘mixed-use mixed-income’ projects to be 
successfully undertaken up by the developer, the CCT will have to focus on a city block or 
precinct basis and not a land parcel basis. It is at this scale where private developers are more 
likely to be interested because it affords 1) the correct location that allows developers to take 





for the developer today, while ensuring that it can conform to future behavioural changes in 
society and 3) size in order to take advantage of economies of scale when adding 
infrastructure that supports the live-work-play scheme. 
 
The three factors above are not in and of themselves, enough criteria for project success, as 
the Foreshore Freeway Project shows. In the Foreshore Freeway Project, while it was in a 
node with enough (especially residential) demand, only one interviewee was involved in 
tendering. The over-arching reason is that developers lacked faith in the CCT to deliver on its 
requirements. A secondary reason is that the project was driven by officials that seemed to 
lack an in-depth knowledge of the property market, resulting in a project scope that was too 
vague. This secondary issue is particularly important where the developer is expected to take 
on most of the project risk. 
4.6 Potential effects of the statutory system 
It will be shown here that CCT actions and the existing culture may lead to property market 
outcomes that run counter to some SPLUMA principles and threaten the successful 
implementation of TOD. The SPLUMA principles are listed as: 
• The principle of spatial justice; 
• The principle of spatial sustainability; 
• The principle of efficiency; 
• The principle of spatial resilience; and  
• The principle of good administration. 
 
The CCT has already acknowledged most if not all of the concerns and issues raised by 
participants in the Framework under ‘Key Challenges’, but what is not explored is the direct 
and indirect effects the CCT has on the property market. The following section will highlight 
some of the second-order effects that were raised and implied during the interviews and 







4.6.1 Increased risk-premium, lower housing affordability levels 
“…this is the part that the politicians and the officials don’t seem to appreciate, the 
developer doesn’t pay, the end user pays.” (D5) 
 
According to developers interviewed, the main driver of financial and opportunity costs when 
readying the land for development lies in interacting and negotiating with the CCT. Figure 18 
below confirms this experience where it clearly illustrates that may take on average 2 years 
to conclude negotiations with the CCT in the land production process (McGaffin, 2018). It is 
for this reason that a participant stated that “time is the killer” (D7). It stands to reason that 
the more uncertain and lengthier this aspect of the land production process is, the higher the 
risk premium a developer will command and with that, a commensurate expectation of return 
which will be passed onto the end-user. This in effect reduces housing affordability levels in 
Cape Town (McGaffin, 2018). 
 
This is consistent with the findings of Nhiwatiwa (2018) where it is reported that when local 
governments releases its own surplus land for commercial development, respondents 
preferred that the land be ‘de-risked’ (for developers) i.e.: appropriate rights are already put 
in place, before it is released to the market. 
 





4.6.2 Limits the efficacy of Land Value Capture (LVC) 
Land Value Capture is an approach in terms of which a public authority can ‘capture’ private 
land value increases, arising from public or government investments/interventions. This 
captured value can be used to offset the costs of the government investment/intervention or 
be used to fund the general fiscus.  
  
Some of the views of developers interviewed are also reflected in research conducted by 
Hogarth (2015) which examined what the City-scale impediments are to spurring affordable 
housing development along transit-orientated corridors. The consistent impediments include 
limited availability of well-located land at affordable prices, excessive parking ratio 
requirements, delays in the development process, and a lack of nuanced market demand 
information. These impediments not only hinder affordable (and therefore dense) housing 
development in well-located areas, but when read together with Beukes (2016), also preclude 
the CCT from employing Land Value Capture to fund public investments. Beukes (2016)  
concluded that certain property submarkets will react differently to public transit investments 
and therefore “it may be more fruitful to select (LVC) mechanisms that target high density 
rental developments… since these are more likely to display positive price responses to the 
introduction of high quality public transport services” (Beukes, 2016:57).  
 
Where there is a delay or hindrance in the provision of high-density rental accommodation in 
transit-orientated corridors, the feasibility and provision of high-quality public transport 
infrastructure is also negatively affected. Diligent precinct, property and financial 
management of these developments along with state-led, high-quality public transport 
infrastructure increases the desirability of such developments which will lead to an increase 
in property values because occupants are dependent on public transport to go about their 
daily routines and would want to live in developments that can provide other amenities.  
 
Therefore regulatory delays, not only reduce housing affordability levels (McGaffin, 2018) and 
affordable housing development (Hogarth, 2015), but in some instances, as outlined by 





4.6.3 Leasehold becomes less feasible 
Unplanned delays during the land production process results in rental property development 
being less feasible for developers. The developer needs to service the debt and development 
costs as soon as possible, but higher upfront costs that arise from unplanned delays result in 
higher levels of liabilities that need to be paid down as soon as possible. Selling on the market 
allows for the paying down of debt at a faster rate than monthly cash flows generated from 
rental portfolios.  
4.6.4 Affects strategic decision-making 
Managing sources and exposure to risk is a key attribute of a prudent developer. So, when a 
developer faces frequent uncertainty from the CCT, his or her investment decision-making 
behaviour adapts.  One developer (D9) made a strategic decision not to develop on greenfield 
sites as a direct result of the Car Park issues and now consciously acquires property that 
generates existing cash flow while formulating and planning for its redevelopment. The 
existing cash flow allows the developer to focus on land production which will be subjected 
to the lengthy and vague approvals process while being able to service the acquisition costs 
of the site.  
4.6.5 Risk-averse designs 
The approvals system produces risk-averse officials which in turn produces risk-averse 
development plans. A developer’s creativity and entrepreneurial flair is curtailed when they 
know the system, they are subjected to will penalise them for trying to ‘think out of the box’.  
 
4.7 Towards a definition of a notional TOD property developer in Cape 
Town 
This section distils the salient findings of chapter 4 and juxtaposes it against the Framework’s 
conceptualisation of a developer, highlighting some of the shortcomings of this 
conceptualisation. It also includes potential TOD Policy implications based on the research 
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Potential TOD policy implications 
1.1) Financial decision-making 
A developer’s principal goal is to 
derive the highest profit from an 
investment, which can be achieved 
through the acquisition (purchase) 
and disposal (sale) of property or 
financing the development/ 
redevelopment of new space. 
 
They do this by identifying the 
demand in the property market such 
as demand for space to work in, to 
operate businesses from, to live in 
and spaces for leisure or recreational 
activities (Isaac, et al. 2010), 
determining its financial feasibility 
and finally by embarking on a 
process of development. 
 
It is critical to note that no private 
sector led project will get built unless 
it yields a return on investment or 
receives a public subsidy to 
compensate for underperformance 
(Belzer and Autler,2002).  
Overlooks the Satisficing 
Developer with Bounded 
Rationality: The Framework 
focusses on a developer that 
maximises profit. 
 
Overlooks the long-term holder: 
The Framework ignores 
developers that prefer to build a 
portfolio of income-producing 






1) Satisficing developers are likely to follow 
the path of least resistance and pursue 
projects that offer satisfactory & sufficing 
profits (in lieu of ‘highest profit’) if they are 
deterred by complex and time-consuming 
TOD/development regulations. This also 
implies that developers are more likely to 
undertake projects that are 
replicable/familiar (risk-averse designs) to 
officials so that the approvals process delays 
are minimised.  
 
2)These developers may elect to build within 
the existing rights of the land if it meets its 
satisficing profit threshold and may prefer 
time-reduction incentives over profit-
maximising ones. This may result in 
developers choosing to forgo additional bulk 
applications if inclusionary housing is 
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Potential TOD Policy implications 
1.1) (continued) Financial decision-
making 
   
 
3)Developers with a long-term 
investment horizon have lower 
immediate profit expectations. Some 
participants have indicated that, with 
sufficient scale and collaboration with 
the CCT, they would be interested in 
developing their own long-term, middle-
income residential portfolios through 
large-scale, mixed-use, high-density 
housing. Here again it must be 
elaborated that “viable/feasible” does 
not equate to maximum profits as it 
would generally be more profitable to 
sell off upper-end housing units to high-
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Potential TOD Policy implications 




The Framework mentions 
that developers may 
perceive TOD as a financial 
risk in areas where there is 
low market demand. The 
Framework also states that 
the goal of a developer is to 
maximise profits (factors 
that increase income) and 
minimise risk (factors that 
reduce costs).” (24). It also 
acknowledges that 
uncertainty arises from 
public interventions, driven 
mainly by the statutory 
development processes. 
Doesn’t acknowledge the 
centrality of risk-reduction:  
Developers interviewed place risk 
reduction at the centre of their 
investment decision-making. 
Developers first interrogate the 
riskiness of a project before 
settling on a profit threshold. 
 
Overlooks factors that influence 
tolerance for degrees of risk: 
Perception of risk and risk 
appetite is partly determined by: 
a) how a financial scenario is 
framed. If it is framed such that 
there is a prospect of a loss, a 
developer may become more 
tolerant of risks (see 1.4 below). 
4.4.2 
To reduce their risk exposure in 
TOD-type developments or where 
there is low real estate demand, 
developers may prefer incentives 
that reduce project risks 
(particularly project timelines) over 
profit-maximising incentives such 
as density bonuses or tax breaks. 
 
Figure 10 in Chapter 2 illustrates the 
potential effect that policy wording 
has on economic actors and may 
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Potential TOD Policy implications 
1.2) (continued) How does he 
perceive risk? 
 b) another determining factor may also 
stem from the source of funding. 
Examples of sources of funding are 
banks, insurance companies, family 
wealth offices, private equity, pension 
funds, and real-estate focus lenders.  
 
Doesn’t define the risk event: The 
Framework does not define the 
outcome of the risk to a developer and 
how this affects the developer’s 
investment decision-making. 
 Developers that have access to 
pension funding are likely to be 
more risk-averse than a developer 
with bank funding, but a pension 
fund-backed developer will also be 
amendable to long-term multi-
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Potential TOD Policy implications 
1.3) Differentiation 
Each developer is unique and will 
likely have its own profit 
benchmark, based on their cost 
and income projections. 
 
This statement does not 
acknowledge that each unique 
developer will also have a 
concomitant risk profile to his or 
her profit benchmark. 
Doesn’t 
differentiate/delineate 
developer archetypes:  
 
Section 4.4.5.1 (Investment 
Horizon) & Section 4.4.5.2 
(size, financial and intellectual 
capital) are some defining 
characteristics that determine 
how certain developers will 
respond to a TOD paradigm. 
Certain developers will be 
more interested in corridor 
TOD projects, while at the 
other end, micro-developers 
may only focus on single erven 
found within Transit-
Accessible Precincts. 
4.4.5 1) There is a need to draft a developer 
archetype matrix for the City. 
 
2) A developer funded with ‘patient 
capital’ and who intentionally holds 
property for the long-term will be more 
amenable to develop large-scale and 
area management plans. 
 
Developer size is a key informant of a 
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The Framework lists normative 
factors that developers use to 
make investment decisions i.e.: 
the “key informants”. Market 
indicators include” vacancy 
rates, property values and 
rental returns, infrastructure 
availability, costs, certainty and 
timing”.  
 
It adds further that the CCT will 
employ incentives “to change 
the behaviour of economic 
actors or influence their 
decisions to achieve specific 
outcomes,” but only in well-
located areas with latent 
demand. 
 
These informants and indicators 
explain “what” is considered by 
a developer when making an 
investment decision. 
Overlooks the ‘how and 
why’ of investment decision-
making: The Framework 
ignores the behavioural 
informants of investment 
decision-making and thus 
implies that developers make 
perfect investment decisions 
under uncertainty and that 
by deploying incentives, 
developer behaviour will 
change. However, this 
research has shown that 
some developers may: 
 
a) may be prone to loss-
avoidance behaviour: They 
are willing to forgo risk-
aversion to stave off the 
prospect of a loss (loss-
aversion) by taking on more 
risk in a project or 
undertaking a risky project. 
4.4.2 
a) Loss-avoidance tendencies may 
result in developers initiating or 
continuing with projects or holding 
onto loss-making properties that they 
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Potential TOD Policy implications 
1.4) (continued) How 
does a developer 
make investment 
decisions? 
 b) possess Bounded 
Rationality when conducting 
investment decision-making 
under uncertainty. The world 
is complex and uncertain and 
thus our ability to be rational 
is constrained or ‘bounded’ 
by overwhelming, but limited 
information, an uncertain 
future and the decisions that 
we need to make based on 
this information. 
4.4.4 b) Most developers will follow the path 
of least resistance when choosing 
between projects that are 
familiar/unfamiliar, that offer the least 
(financial and mental) burden even if it 
produces a satisficing (satisfactory and 
sufficing) and not maximum profit. In 
other words, developers may choose 
not to develop in TOD-designated areas 
that are layered with incentives if it is 
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Developers and investors may 
find it difficult to conceive 
that TOD can be profitable, 
particularly in areas that lack 
market demand. There is a 
perception that TOD involves 
higher risks and costs than other 
types of development (16). 
This cohort of developers 
unequivocally supports the 
TOD concept, however they 
did not seem to possess an in-
depth understanding of what 
it represents for the CCT. 
 
It would seem however that it 
is not just TOD that is 
perceived as having higher 
risk or higher costs thresholds, 
but the entire approvals 
system poses a greater risk. 
Developers prefer that 
building blocks first be put in 
place that are properly 
facilitative of TOD. 
4.5 All developers interviewed placed a 
higher preference for an approvals 
process that is simple, streamlined and 
predictable instead of revenue-
generating incentives such as density 
bonuses. 
 
This suggests that without intervening in 
the approvals system itself, TOD may not 
be pursued by the private sector even 
with profit-maximising incentives such 
as extra bulk or a relaxation of set-backs. 
Profit-maximising incentives may 
increase profitability but may lead to the 
usual ambiguity, confusion and delays 
when projects are subjected to the 
current approvals system. 
Table 20: TOD Strategic Framework's conceptualisation of a Cape Town property developer juxtaposed against the main research findings and potential TOD policy implications (Abdullah, 






This section presented, analysed and discussed the interview data. The central aim of the 
section was to contrast what is defined as a developer in the Framework with what the results 
suggests. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 was used to enrich this process. The discussion 
pivoted on applying alternative economics theoretical frameworks to define a developer, 
what are developer perceptions of the City of Cape Town and what second-order effects City 
of Cape Town behaviour has on developer sentiment. Lastly, this section directly contrasted 
interview results against the Framework’s definition of a developer according to five over-
arching themes i.e.: financial decision-making, perception of risk, differentiation, investment 
decision-making process and perception of TOD as tabled in Table 20.  
 
Ultimately, the table presents gaps in the CCT’s conceptualisation of what a notional property 
developer in Cape Town is. In highlighting these gaps, and potential policy implications, this 
Dissertation has addressed what it set out to do in Chapter 1 and that is to “to present a more 
nuanced understanding of a notional property developer in Cape Town, thereby allowing for 
the advancement of a developer policy construct and the formulation of tools and incentives 













CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter serves to summarise the salient points that can be concluded from the literature 
review and interview analysis and interpretation and presents an evaluation of the research 
proposition articulated in Chapter 1 against the main findings of this dissertation. 
Recommendations for further areas of study in this field, which were beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, are also listed. 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 opened by stating what this dissertation’s “analytical ambition” (Guy & Hanneberry, 
2002: 286) will be. That is, to showcase a richer view of the notional property developer in Cape 
Town within a Transit-Orientated Development (“TOD”) context. If TOD is a paradigm shift in 
how the City of Cape Town (“CCT”) will manage the spatial growth and demographic distribution 
of Cape Town and expect developers to follow suit, then surely it must view the developer and 
its relations with the built environment within an equally radical paradigm. 
 
To achieve this ambition, this dissertation set out to explore to what extent the CCT understands 
the property developer within a TOD context. This was explored by juxtaposing the perspective 
of the CCT (through the Framework) with the developer’s (interview participant’s) self-
perception of developing in Cape Town (Table 20). The interviews also explored if there is a need 
and/or opportunity for CCT officials working in the built environment to re-cast themselves. 
These are important considerations for the successful rollout of TOD. 
 
The research method consisted of rich qualitative interviews where the negative and positive 
perceptions of the CCT were coded. Deeper analysis of these perceptions and what gave rise to 
them where presented in Chapter 4, where the results of the interviews were presented and 
analysed. 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the key findings, presents conclusions, and 
recommendations drawn from the analysis, and how the study has addressed the research 






Below is a summary analysis of the main findings of this dissertation. This dissertation has found 
that the CCT has a limited understanding of a developer in Cape Town. This limited understanding 
runs the risk that the CCT’s TOD levers may become ineffective for the purposes for which they 
are deployed and may even impede the CCT from achieving stated policy objectives.  
 
A broader paradigm of understanding has instead found that developers require ‘building blocks’ 
or pre-requisite elements to “shift their current business as usual approach to one aligned to the 
principles and objectives of TOD” (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 46) before any levers can be 
deployed. These building blocks should be complimented with what the CCT calls ‘strategic 
levers’ (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 50) to leverage a change in developer behaviour.  
 
The CCT TOD levers are: 
• Better engagement (a shift from control to collaboration); 
• Incentives to stimulate development consistent with TOD development guidelines; 
• Disincentives to curb development in undesirable locations; 
• Streamlined and transparent planning approvals; and  
• Intervention or the use of the property cycle as a forecasting tool for planning. 
 






Figure 17: Four building blocks this dissertation recommends be put in place to shift developer behaviour within a TOD 
paradigm (Abdullah, 2019) 
 
 
5.2.1 Narrow conceptualisation of a TOD developer 
Adams, Croudace & Tiesdell (2012) state that public policy and its instruments are more than an 
approved regulatory agenda, they are a declaration by the policy-makers of their understanding, 
interpretation and construction of the world they operate in and how it works. The policy also 
indicates who the relevant stakeholders are, and which policy or framework is technically sound 
and politically palatable.  
 
The model of the developer used in the TOD Strategic Framework seems to have very strong 
neo-classical economics undertones. This view of economic actors is prescriptive in how they 
should react based on the concept of the perfect rational actor. This actor can make perfect and 
rational choices all the time, operating in the ideal world. Policy makers presume that policy 
instruments and incentives are a one-size-fits-all solution and developers will react according to 






This may not happen because, as this dissertation has shown, there are other sources of 
influence that subconsciously guide the investment-decision-making process. This dissertation 
has shown that institutional arrangements and behavioural biases also affect developer decision-
making, especially as it relates to risk. These oft-ignored ‘influencers’ on investment decision-
making dictate the developer’s inclination or disinclination towards TOD-type projects and the 
developer’s willingness to collaborate with the CCT within a TOD context.  
 
This is consistent with the critique by Morgan (2010) and Moore (2015) whereby inaccurate 
framing of real estate research (using normative, prescriptive research) leads to inaccurate policy 
constructs.  
 
The dissertation has found key traits that may exists amongst certain types of developers. The 
two central findings are found within the institutional and behavioural context. The institutional 
context will be discussed in further detail in sub-section 5.2.3. 
 
The behavioural context has found that developers may not necessarily be responsive to TOD 
tools and incentives that focus on profit maximisation. It was found that some developers 
possess one or all the following traits, based on key concepts from behavioural economics, read 
together with potential TOD policy implications found in Table 20: 
 
Key behavioural traits uncovered Potential TOD policy implications 
The Satisficing Developer and his or her Bounded 
Rationality 
 
1) Satisficing developers are likely to follow the 
path of least resistance and pursue projects 
that offer satisfactory and sufficing profits if 
they are deterred by complex and time-
consuming TOD/development regulations. 
This also implies that developers are more 
likely to undertake projects that are 
replicable/familiar (risk-averse designs) to 
officials so that the approvals process delays 
are minimised.  
2) These developers may elect to build within 
the existing rights of the land if he or she meets 
their satisficing profit threshold and may 





maximising ones. This may result in developers 
choosing to forgo additional bulk applications 
if inclusionary housing is perceived as 
risky/complex. 
The centrality of risk-reduction, not profit-
maximisation 
To reduce their risk exposure in TOD-type 
developments or where there is low real 
estate demand, developers may prefer 
incentives that reduce project risks 
(particularly project timelines) over profit-
maximising incentives such as density bonuses 
or tax breaks. 
 
Figure 9 in Chapter 2 demonstrates the 
potential effect of policy wording on economic 
actors that may nudge certain developers into 
action.  
 
Developers that have access to pension 
funding are likely to be more risk-averse than 
a developer with bank funding, but a pension 
fund-backed developer will also be amendable 
to long-term multi-phase place-making 
projects. 
May be prone to behavioural biases 
Loss-avoidance tendencies may result in 
developers initiating or continuing with 
projects or holding onto loss-making 
properties that they would not ordinarily 
undertake or hold. 
Willingness to develop long-term residential 
property portfolios 
Developers with a long-term investment 
horizon have lower immediate profit 
expectations. Some participants have 
indicated that with enough scale and 
collaboration with the CCT, they would be 
interested in developing their own long-term 
middle-income residential portfolios through 
large-scale, mixed-use, high-density housing. 
Here again it must be elaborated that such 
developments are not maximum profit-
generating as it would generally be more 
profitable to sell off upper-end housing units 
to high-income earners (Nurick et al., 2018). 





5.2.2 Decisions not focused on quality of spatial outcomes 
More important than making a decision with beneficial consequences is making a decision that 
is easy to explain and defend, especially should the consequences turn out badly - Sutherland 
(undefined/ed: 5) 
 
The entire local government approvals system is perceived as an overwhelmingly negative 
experience for developers. Officials are perceived to be risk-averse in their application of policy 
and decision-making. The key drivers behind this are political pressure, under-resourced staff 
compliment, existing culture within the approvals system and unwillingness to think creatively 
or collaboratively. Public participation, which is intertwined with political pressure, was routinely 
identified by developers as a major contributor to their risk premium. Officials in turn are guided 
primarily by public pressure to first think how easily a decision can be explained or defended, 
and then on the outcomes of that decision. 
 
In other words, it is easier for politicians and officials to make a decision within the current spatial 
paradigm, which is informed by the apartheid spatial planning and existing imbalances in the 
distribution of different types of residential development (City of Cape Town c, 2017: executive 
summary), than to defend a planning decision that runs counter to the vested interests of, for 
example, home owners that are used to living in spaces designed around a private transport 
centric, low-density suburb.  
 
5.2.3 Centrality of understanding City of Cape Town’s role and influence on the 
property market 
Before the CCT attempts to understand the property developer and the property market, it must 
first understand its role and influence as a property market institution on the developer’s 
investment behaviour. The CCT already acknowledges in the TOD Framework that the approvals 
system is fraught with delays and uncertainties, but it does not take the next step in 
understanding: a) how the property market functions; b) how each actor within the property 
market operates and makes decisions that affect the broader market; and c) where the CCT as 






By understanding the social and market dynamics of property and the CCT impacts of these 
dynamics, the CCT may, for example be able to understand its role in the following ways: 
a) Social dynamics: according to developers, the public participation process (often cited 
by developers as a main cause of delay) is debilitative and skewed in favour of those who 
object and have a vested interest in seeing a development fail. The wider implication for 
the CCT and TOD’s intention to promote mixed-income housing and urban-infill 
developments is that those that are already represented within the institutional 
arrangements (fellow developers and existing home owners) may express greater 
opposition to housing development (across all income bands), in order to protect their 
assets’ value from declining (e.g.: an increase in supply of housing will lower the price of 
housing in a local area). TOD-type applications may be vulnerable to political pressure 
and short-term group thinking amongst home-owners (Coelho, Dellepiane-Avellaneda & 
Ratnoo, 2017). 
b) Market dynamics: If CCT understands the market and the players operating within it, it 
may, for example, use a sub-set of private developers, such as the micro developer, as a 
key agent for the provision of affordable formal housing (McGaffin, Spiropoulous & 
Boyle, 2018). 
  
5.2.4 New spatial paradigm requires a new approvals system and City of Cape Town 
official 
Developers have made it clear that before the CCT rolls out TOD Strategic Levers to shift 
developer behaviour, the CCT should first focus on getting the basics rights within the approvals 
system if it cannot overhaul it. It needs to instil a customer-centric culture and reduce the mental 
burden (as per the Bounded Rationality concept) when navigating the approvals systems such 
that it is easily understandable, simplified and predictable, but not open to abuse.  
 
In doing so, CCT will start to rebuild confidence and trust in the system, without which, new 
spatial agendas, incentives and creativity will be looked upon with scepticism and reticence. 
Where CCT requires the active partnering of private developers, it must first instil trust and 





equipped and skilled before it undertakes major catalytic TOD property regeneration projects 
(Lord & O’Brien, 2017 and Thomas et al., 2018). 
 
A new mould of official needs to be cast that will be able to package, manage and negotiate on 
major CCT-led property projects. The job requirement focus at senior levels should be on 
aptitude and personality, and then on experience and knowledge.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Based on the research results and findings, the TOD Strategic Framework does not sufficiently 
conceptualise and understand the developer to effectively change his/her investment behaviour.   
 
The incentive structure should shift from profit-maximising incentives to that of risk-reduction. 
This will be a critical prerequisite, although not exclusively, where there are perceived high 











In reducing the upfront risks, the CCT automatically, all things equal, places the developer in a 
position where “the upside potential exceeds the downside risk” (Marks, 2014: 4). However, 
there are three recommendations which the CCT must first explore: 
5.3.1 Understand the development actor holistically 
There is more to a developer’s investment behaviour than the implied perception that they are 
profit-maximiser first, then risk mitigators that will readily respond to levels of enticements. 
 
The TOD Strategic Framework has failed to conceptualise a developer that may be influenced by 
wider societal undercurrents and institutional arrangements. Secondly, and as stated in the 
preceding section, this cohort of developer interviewed focusses on risk-reduction and not profit-
maximisation. Other important characterisations unearthed during interviews include traces of 
preferring satisfactory and sufficing (‘satisficing’) profits instead of maximal profits, bounded 
rationality, behavioural biases, and a willingness to develop and hold a long-term portfolio of 
properties.  
 
The proposed levers found in the TOD Strategic Framework apply a blanket treatment to 
developers that act in isolation, make understandable and rational investment decisions and 
readily respond to a set of tools and incentives for designated spatial areas.  
 
A developer with some or all the behavioural traits mentioned above will respond very 
differently, and possibly contrary to objectives, tools and incentives that were formulated for a 
normative developer. 
5.3.2 City of Cape Town must understand its role and influence on the property market 
The CCT must understand that it is not apart from the property market, but a component of it. 
 
Both developer and the CCT are in constant competition to decide what is in Cape Town’s best 
spatial interest. The CCT’s primary role from a policy perspective is to counter-balance “the 
owner’s interest in developing the land with the City of Cape Town’s interest in matters for the 
common good and the community’s interests in being protected from any adverse impacts that 






Its stated role definition above highlights the CCT’s narrow self-perception. This dissertation has 
found that not only do the actions of the CCT have a direct effect on the local property market, 
and by extension, the rules of the game, but that its own actions hinder it from achieving its own 
spatial objectives. Perhaps because it views the property market though its narrow and self-
perceived paradigm that it cannot see the second-order effects that its actions have. 
 
Developers have expressed the view that if the CCT wants to spatially restructure Cape Town, it 
must see itself as being part of the property market and not just a creator, administrator and 
enforcer of rules. It must “have one eye on the rule book, and one eye on (market) reality” (D5). 
This doesn’t require that officials become market experts, but that they have a semblance of 
industry and market knowledge. This will allow CCT to be flexible and responsive to TOD 
applications.  
 
It was suggested by participants that implementing a redefined role at personnel level should 
start at the recruitment phase for senior positions. Recruitment should focus first on the 
personality type and then the competencies and experience. It is important to ensure that 
officials who step into a redefined role have the appropriate attitude and mind-set. In other 
words, the personality profile or description should lead the job profile or description at senior 
management level.  
 
Furthermore, higher value projects such as the CCT-led TOD catalytic projects should be 
differentiated from simpler applications. This differentiation can be delineated by the “The 
McDonalds way” (D3) (simple, high volume applications) and “the private banking way” (D3) 
(complex, high value applications) where an official with a multi-disciplinary hat is assigned to 









5.3.3 Bounded Rationality may determine degree of participation in TOD projects, 
profits 
The CCT must first reduce the high levels of uncertainty and unpredictably in the approvals 
system before it is offering levers of enticements.  
 
The level and magnitude of uncertainty and unpredictability that exists within the approvals 
system is so great, that developers “don’t know what they (the CCT) are going to come up with 
next” (D5) and would “…rather not have any of those incentives, and just have a simple, clear, 
process of engagement.” (D5). This means they cannot price nor plan for the approvals system 
in its feasibility studies with confidence. This cohort of developer places a higher premium on an 
approvals process that is simple, predictable and has a clear process of engagement, than it does 
on a revenue-generating incentive such as density bonuses or other mechanisms. 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, despite the potential that developers see in TOD projects, developers 
may be dissuaded due to the following concerns: 
Increased development 
complexity 
Restrictive building envelopes along transit ways and within 
dense urban areas; intense co-ordination amongst 
stakeholders; community objections to intensification and 
densification; sophisticated use of public and private 
finance.  
Extra-costs Speculation leading to increasing land costs; compulsory 
TOD infrastructure; alternative sources of financing 
required such as LVC. 
Table 22: TOD-specific characteristics that developers must grapple with (Lister, 2007; Belzer et al., 2009; Guthrie & Fan, 2016) 
 
When applying the concept of Bounded Rationality to the table above, developers in Cape Town 
may be reluctant to pursue such projects even if the CCT focusses on reducing the ‘extra costs’ 
or by providing incentives such as various discounts, rebates and payment holidays as mentioned 
in the Framework. Furthermore, if developers must choose between pursuing a TOD 
development with ‘increased development complexity’ while the approvals system remains as 







By simplifying, streamlining and making the approvals system predictable, the developer’s 
bounded rationality expands, thereby making him or her more amenable to deploy his or her 
mental functions to new types of developments, such as TOD that comes with new forms of 
financing such as Land Value Capture. 
 
Lastly, the popularity of incentives is largely dependent on the state of the current property 
market. However, an initiative to simplifying, streamlining and making the approvals system 
predictable, is not dependant on property market activity and is largely within the control of the 
CCT. 
 
5.4 The Achievement of Research Aims & Objectives 
5.4.1 Research Aim 
This research aims to present a more nuanced understanding of a notional property developer 
in Cape Town within a TOD context, thereby allowing for the advancement of a developer policy 
construct and the formulation of tools and incentives (levers) predicated on behaviour, rather 
than on policy. 
 
It is not meant to draw a distinction between a right or wrong model of a local property 
developer, but to investigate what a less inaccurate model would look like using alternative 
economic perspectives that capture the multiplicity of realities. 
 
5.5 Evaluation of research questions and research proposition  
This dissertation addressed the following research questions: 
 
1. What is the depth of the City of Cape Town ’s understanding of a developer? 
The CCT seems to be over-reliant on a narrow normative, neo-classical economics 
construct of a property developer. This TOD policy construct has led to TOD tools and 
incentives (levers) focused on a developer that operates free of institutional influences 





2. What perceptions do developers have of the City of Cape Town and what has given rise 
to it? 
The overriding perception is negative, fuelled primarily by a perceived lack of knowledge 
and a basic grasp of property market dynamics, reliance on defendable decisions to the 
public and politicians, lack of clear policy parameters and inconsistent application 
thereof, and a lack of a customer-centric culture. It seems that the CCT’s own narrow self-
perception as merely an administrator and enforcer of planning and building 
development policies is the primary cause. By seeing itself so narrowly it precludes the 
municipality of thinking of itself as part of and influencing the property market beyond 
its administrative and enforcement role. 
 
3. What effects, if any, will the Transit-Orientated Development Strategic Framework and 
other related spatial policies potentially have on the developer’s investment 
behaviour?  
The CCT, as a component of the property market, is already an unconscious property 
market ‘influencer’. The findings of this dissertation suggest that the current 
administration of policies by CCT officials has been found to contribute towards 
increasing the developer’s risk premium, distorting housing affordability, potentially 
limiting the efficacy of using Land Value Capture, reducing the feasibility of developing 
leasehold real estate products, actively affecting strategic decision-making of the 
developer, and contributing to the submission of risk-averse designs.  
 
4. Are there opportunities for public officials to re-cast themselves? 
An opportunity exists for public officials to re-cast and reskill themselves in a TOD context. 
Developers are of the view that there is too much focus on making easily understood and 
defendable decisions to the public and politicians while not focussing on the low-quality 
spatial outcomes such decisions have on the built environment. Furthermore, this re-cast 
official must be market and institutionally-cognisant, while senior personnel should be 







5.6 Evaluation of research proposition  
As articulated in Chapter 1, the research proposition is stated as: 
 
The current policy paradigm within which the CCT understands a property developer may not 
incentivise the developer sufficiently to act in accordance with TOD policy, resulting in the CCT’s 
failure to achieve its TOD objectives. 
 
The dissertation has shown that the CCT’s TOD Strategic Framework has a limited understanding 
of a property developer. This limited understanding in turn has led to the formulation of TOD 
policy levers that the CCT intends to use to incentivise developers to participate in TOD-type 
developments. 
 
This blanket understanding of developers may lead to limited success in TOD projects particularly 
in nodes with weak property markets. This dissertation has shown that there are pivotal 
institutional influences and behavioural traits missing from the CCT’s understanding of a 
developer and may lead to policy failure. In summary, the CCT has downplayed its influence on 
the property market when in fact it plays a key role in influencing the ‘rules of the game’. 
Furthermore, it has also formulated the developer and an incentive structure based upon profit-
maximisation whereas this dissertation has found that, the developers interviewed tended to, 
inter-alia, focus on risk reduction and then profits, exhibit satisficing behaviour and loss-aversion 
(not to be confused with risk-aversion) tendencies. There are also some which preferred to build 
and hold a portfolio of rental properties. This type of developer possesses a different outlook 
and investment behaviour than the one defined in the Framework.  
 
This cohort of developers (which can be ranked as large and highly experienced) places risk, or 
the probability of a permanent loss of capital, at the centre of its calculations, followed only then 
by profits. To ensure developers with these tendencies assist the CCT in achieving TOD 
objectives, the incentive structure must shift to one that reduces risk. Without addressing this 
‘definition-gap’, these developers will be bounded to (non-TOD) projects that they are familiar 






Without understanding these distinctions, developers may not necessarily, predictably and 
readily respond to any TOD tools and incentives to spur TOD-type developments, thereby 
perpetuating the very unequal spatial status quo the City of Cape Town aims to redress. 
5.7 Areas for further research 
The following areas of further research are suggested that will complement and develop ideas 
raised in, but which fall outside the scope of this dissertation:  
• What is the CCT’s view of the developer, based on the perceptions of town planners, 
engineers, spatial planners, transport planners and property management officials? 
• What is the legislated social housing developer’s perceptions of the CCT and what effects 
does the CCT have on his or her behaviour? 
• How will the TOD affect the middle and lower-income housing markets in Cape Town and 
what should be done to ensure that existing housing development patterns are not 
replicated under TOD? 
• A behavioural economics approach to defining a property developer within a public-led 
regeneration/catalytic project. 
• Developing a Complex Adaptive Systems approach to the property development process 
and the property market in South Africa. 
• Developing a Complex Adaptive Systems approach to the local approvals system in Cape 
Town. 
• What are the underlying causes of failure to implement Land Value Capture in cities in 
emerging countries; how did the underlying causes arise and what can be done to 
mitigate against these? 
• What are the underlying causes of failure to implement Transit-Orientated Development 
in developing countries; how did the underlying causes arise and what can be done to 
mitigate against these? 
• What are the key differentiating characteristics between a micro or part-time developer 






5.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter presented the high-level summary of the main findings, recommendations, and 
conclusions of this research, conducted an evaluation of whether the dissertation has achieved 
the research aims, answered the research questions and whether it has supported the research 
proposition. 
 
This dissertation concludes that the Framework has not accurately conceptualised the property 
developer. This is because the CCT has not considered the wider institutional influences that may 
affect developers and where such influences occur, how this influence may affect a developer 
making an investment decision within a TOD context.  
 
By employing both the behavioural and institutional economics theoretical frameworks, it was 
shown that a developer’s behaviour, and the CCT’s role in the property market is not as framed 
in the Framework. Lastly, what this dissertation has shown is that just as TOD is a new way of 
thinking of spatial growth strategies, it follows that new “conversations premised on the idea that 
there may be more to behaviour than the narrow pursuit of economic self-interest…” (Sutherland, 
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Annexure A: classification of small vs large developer 
 





Annexure B: list of interview questions 
Warm-up question: You are assessing a development that may bring in gross R2m profit but, due to lack of development opportunities, debt 
servicing commitments, deal structuring and unforeseen economic circumstances are forced to choose facing either of the following scenarios 
once the development is complete: 
Development A: 50% chance of losing R1m and a 50% chance of losing nothing 





• What does your work at the company entail? For how long have you been developing property in CT? No. of 
employees and consultants under your supervision? 
• Value of portfolio? Proportion (based on R value) of portfolio based in CT? What is the value of your development 
pipeline in CT? How many projects are currently live in CT? 
• What is your target market and what type of developments do you specialise in?  
Understanding of 
the role and purpose 




• Describe how you see the state of the CT property market 
• What are the CT property market’s key attractions and risks? 
• Describe what property development means to you 
• What is the most crucial point or stage of a property development project for a developer? 
• What has your experience as a developer been with and of CCT (primary exposure through which department?) 
been like? 
• What do you think is the biggest driver of developer behaviour when it decides to develop within the City? Can 
you give a City-controlled (e.g.: development contributions) example and one which the City has no control over 










how it relates to 
policy 
 
• Do you feel that the industry is over-regulated in so far as local government administration and enforcement is 
concerned? How so? What in your opinion is the ideal role of the City in the property development industry? 
• Do you actively keep abreast of City policies, has City policy ever played a leading role in affecting investment 
decision-making? Do you make a point of adhering to any spatial framework?  
• What has your experience been in accessing City policies, processes, forms and personnel for development-
related issues? 
• When do you feel City officials are at their most obstructionist (e.g.: refusing upzoning, departures of setbacks, 
payment arrangement on municipal arrears- be specific) and are not willing to negotiate and when do you feel 
they are at their most helpful? When this scenario arises, and the official processes has now been exhausted, 
how readily do you appeal using informal channels to their superiors and even political heads? Are the political 
heads more receptive to your appeals? 
• Should policy and policy instruments reflect the property market or vice-versa. Justify your answer 
• Where do you see the development industry and the property market headed in terms of City and TOD 
objectives? Are City objectives and private property development products diverging or converging? Justify your 
answer? 
• What are your thoughts on the following phrase: 
Without understanding developers (market-driven actors), the City’s (welfare-driven actors) TOD projects will 





Insight into an 
understanding and 
comprehension of 
the TOD Strategic 
Framework 
 
• What does TOD in the City mean for you? How do you see it impacting on the Cape Town property market and 
property development in particular? 
• What do you consider to be the most important aspect for spurring private TOD-type projects in CT? 
• What do you think of the City’s definition of a developer as described below? 
A developer’s principle goal is to derive the highest profit from an investment, which can be achieved through the 
acquisition (purchase) and disposal (sale) of property or financing the development/redevelopment of new space. 
They do this by identifying the demand in the property market such as demand for space to work in, to operate 
businesses from, to live in and spaces for leisure or recreational activities (Isaac, et al. 2010), determining its 
financial feasibility and finally by embarking on a process of development. It is critical to note that no private sector 
led project will get built unless it yields a return on investment or receives a public subsidy to compensate for 
underperformance (Belzer and Autler, 2002). Each developer is unique and will likely have its own profit benchmark, 
which is a function of cost and income and will ideally be projected through a 
developer’s feasibility (City of Cape Town b, 2016: 24). Justify your answer? 
• It categorically proclaims that it has a “sub-optimal relationship with the private sector” (City of Cape Town b, 
2016: 16), do you think this is an accurate reflection? If so, what would you like to see being done to improve it? 
• Has there been talk amongst your peers about TOD? What is the zeitgeist like? 
• How has the TOD Strategic Framework influenced your company’s modus operandi and projects thus far? Have 
you considered a TOD project yet? Motivate your answer to the last question 





Redefining the role 
and skills of City 
officials 
• The City wants to pivot towards being a facilitator of TOD property development projects within Transit-
Accessible Precincts and Integration Zones. In what specific way do you want/see the City to be a facilitator of 
property development in general and TOD projects in particular?  
• Is the City adequately skilled to deal with developers in general and specifically within a TOD paradigm especially 
when it comes to catalytic projects? Justify your answer 
• What type of professional background/skill set/ training do you think officials are lacking, if any, in dealing with 
developers in general 
• What type of professional background/skill set/ training do you think officials are strong in, if any, in dealing with 
developers in general 
• What training/educational interventions would you like to see, if any, from the City and/or tertiary education 
curriculums? 
• What sort of interventions can the private sector play in this regard? What can be done to enhance its role in 
upskilling/educating officials? 
• Do you think developers have the necessary skills and understanding to interact with City officials? 
 
 
Closing question: You are assessing a development that may bring in gross R2m profit but, due to lack of development opportunities, debt 
servicing commitments, deal structuring and unforeseen economic circumstances are forced to choose facing either of the following scenarios 
once the development is complete: 
Scenario A: 50% chance that you are left with R1m and a 50% chance that you are left with the R2m 
Scenario B: you are left with R1.5m with certainty 
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Annexure D: link to full set of interview transcripts 
Google Drive 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1owqMyy1-18qpJig6gJsvRvrpnR-
fmwEo?usp=sharing 
